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Abstract 
\Yc examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete iuformarion owr 
0ach others· t rue prefer0nces. In many rcsp0cts, this work is motin"ltf'd hy a d0sir0 to 
provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic \"Oting. 
Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences bebveen the incenti\·es fac0d 
by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality. or prob-
ability of victory in single member. single vote. sirn ple plurality electoral systems. 
\Ye find that, in general. the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system 
,·ary greatly dep<'nding on their ohj<'ctive function. \Ve provide several examples, as 
well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with 
respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for can-
didates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize 
probability of victory. 
In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which indi-
\·iduals' preferences are subject to action-specific 0xogenons shocks. \Ye show that 
::\ash equilibria exist in ,·oting games possessing such an information structure and iu 
which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter·s preferences are subject 
to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters a re playing 
a Quanta[ Re~pon~e Eq'U'ili/;r·i'Um (l\IcKelvey and Palfrey (1995) , (1998)) . We theu 
examine candidate competition in such games a nd show that, for sufficiently large 
rlrctoratrs, rrgardlcss of t hr di mcnsionali ty of thr policy spacr or thr number of can-
didates, t here exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., t he point 
which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we 
find that this equilibrium is unique. 
Finally. in Chapter -1, we atLempt lhe first steps towards a theory of equili brium in 
games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. 
Our notion of equil ibrium. Variational R esponse Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all 
\' 
£JllllPS \\·ith rontinuous pa.yoff f11nrtions. \\'p discuss thP s imil a.r itiPs a.nd diffrrenc<>s 
hPt\Yeen this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quanta! RC'sponse Equilibrium 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Games of incomplete information arise in many settings. Perhaps rhc mosr p cn·asiw 
of such sPttings is environnwnts in \\·hich many indivi<iua ls· actions Pach affPct on<' 
another. Such em·ironments are iuherentlv charactNized b.\· incomplete information 
since it is usually impossible for any individual to know every other indiviclual"s 
preferences or motives, for example. 
Iu the follO\\·iug chapters, we examine au application of t he t heory of games of 
incomplete information to voting situations . In particular. we examine models in 
which proposals are made to a group of voters whose truP preferPnces 0\·er outcomes 
arc incomplete information. 
\\·e attempt to answer se,·eral questions, including exammmg the incenti,·es to 
candidates in elections where candidates have incomplete information about ,·oters' 
true preferences (Chapter 2). characterizing a .'\ash E'q uili bri um of spatial voting 
games when the number of voters is large (Chapter 3), and defining a notion of 
Pqnilihri nm for games of incompletf' information in which there exists a met ric on rhe 
action space (Chapter .J). 
1.1 Literature Review 
This work is closely related to that of many other scholars. This sect ion att empts 
to review previous work. The relationships bet\\·een this work and earlier results arc 
outlined when helpful. 
1.1.1 Related Work on Games of Incomplete Infonnation 
:\lost of this research is firmly embedded in a Bayesian environment. As such , t his 
work would not have been po, si ble wi Llwu t the pioueering research of Harsan_vi ( l9G7-
68). \\·hich defined the primiti\·es and earliest solu tion concepts for games of incom-
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plere informarion. 
Similarly. most of the primitives used in this research satisfy the condi tions im-
posed by :\1ilgrom and \ Yeber (1985) in a seminal work on distributional strategies 
and Bayesian I\ ash equilibria in games of incomplete information. \ Ye use their exis-
tcuce and purification theorems in Chapter 3 a mi providC' results :;imilar to their:; in 
Chapter 4. 
1.1.2 R elated Work on Candidate Objectives 
Sewral articles discussing properties of different candidate strategies ,,·ere published 
in the 1970s. Foremost among these early efforts is Aranson, Hinich. ann Orcteshook 
(197-1) . :\ranson, et al. offer an equi,·alence result which rests on assumptions re-
garding perturbations of the candidate 's objective functions, perhaps representing 
for0cast errors. Their result . however , requires that these forecast errors are unbiased 
and. more importantly, Lhat the errors are uncorrelated with the strategies chosen 
by the candidates. As the authors point out, this assumpt ion is untenable, since the 
valnC' of the objective functions (even a fter the errors arc taken into account) must 
fall between zero and one. A second equivalence result obtained by :\ranson. et al. 
requires that the , ·otes recei,·cd in a two candidate election be distributed according to 
a multivariate normal dis tribution. This obviously requires that negati,·e vote totals 
be a positive probability event. Aranson , et at. were unable to offer any equivalence 
re:;ults between expected plurality and probability of victory based on assumptions 
regarding the primitives of the model. 
Hinich (1977), however, provided justification for examin ing expected vote share 
in place of probability of victory which depended only on t he Central Limit Theorem. 
Ilinich 's equivalence result states that the two objectiw functions converged in 2 
candidate elections without a bstention. This finding was extended by Ledyard (1984) 
to iudude 2 candidate election:; in which absteutiou i:; allowed. Providiug intuition 
for his claim, Ledyard argues at the limit. which is never actually realized in his 
framework. In arldition. then' is a discontinuity a t the limit, making his argum ent 
impossible to generalize immediately for finite numbers of voters. 
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1.1.3 R e lated Work on Probablisitic Voting 
). l uch other literature has studi<•d probabilistic votiug (see Cougbliu (1992) for are-
,·iew of this literature). Hinich (1977) showed that the median ,·oter theorem docs 
not a I ways hold in a setting with proba hi list ie ,·oti ng. and he constructf'd exam pies 
iu a one-dimensional space with equilibria at other locations. In particular. with 
quadratic utility functions. he obtaiued au equilibrium in two candidate elections at 
the mean ("·hich is the social welfare optimum with those preferences). Coughlin 
aud :\itzan (1981a). (1981b) (see also Coughliu (1992), p. 9G, Theorem -!.2) prowd 
if voters haw likelihood of voting functions satisfying the Luce axioms o,·er subsets, 
thf're is a !oral equilibrium at a point maximizing the social log likelihood. \\"bile this 
work \vas not explicitly rooted in a utility ma..-ximization framework, subsequent work 
(sec (1992). p . 99-100. Corollaries .JA and 4.5. Theorem 4.2) shows how it can be so 
interpreted. Coughlin (1992) also gives various conditions on voter likelihood func-
tions or on preferences that result in a global equilibrium. If the likelihood functions 
arc concaYe. there is a global equilibrium. In are-distributional model where voters 
haw logarithmir utility functions for income. and candidates usC' a logistic model to 
estimate the probability that voters vote for each candidate, there is a global equi-
librium at the social utility maximum (p. 57, Theorem 3.7). All of the above results 
ar<' for t\\·o candidate competition. Recently. Lin. Enelow and Dorussen (1999) show 
that one can also obtain equilibrium for multi-candidate elections using probabilist ic 
voting models. They a.ssunw preferences based on distance. with a random utility 
shock. and obtain local equilibria at the social utility maximum. Lin, ct. al. also find 
that if the utility shocks have high enough variance, then the expected vote function 
for each candidate becomes concave, implying the existence of a global equilibrium. 
Recent work by Banks and Duggan (1999) examines the properties of spatial 
competition between two caudidates in a very general class of models of probabilistic 
\·otillg. They assume that voters· probabilistic behavior is a fuuct ion of the preferences 
over the policy space, rather than the expected utility of each action. Thus, voters' 
behavior is im·ariant to thf' probability that their vote \viii have any effPct. Banks anc! 
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D11gg<tll shm1· that t lw point which !llaxitniz<'s the• Slllll oft h<' nners' urility functions 
has a SJH'('ial propC'rt_, .. in that it is . ,·cry generally. a critical point of both candidat<'s· 
c•xpected ,·ote share. The1· also pro1·idC' results l'Oitccrning the colltinuit\· of --altt tost 
con'· policic•s 1dwn the core --almost'· exists. "·here almost is ckfi m·d topulogicalh· on 
I h<' spal'l' of possible policic~. 
Ill all of the abow• cited probabilistic n>ring literature. ganlC' thC'oretic consid-
c•nHions for rlw \'Olf'r arP not modf'IC'd. \·oters arC' asstt!ll('d to ,-or<' has<'d 011 1 h<'ir 
prden'llccs for the candidate policy positions rathC'r t hall based on the dfect their 
-''OtP "·ill haw on the• outcome of th<' election. Ledyard ( 19 -1) dew lops a Ba.wsian 
model of t11·o candidate compNition that docs model the game theoretic consiclera-
t iolls for the ,·otcr. lu his mod(']. ,·oters n)tc deterministically (tlten• is llO random 
utility shock to prefC'rcnccs). but t hC'y can abstain as ,,·ell as Yotc for onC' of the t \\'0 
candidate's . and the cost of 1·oting is a random ,-ar iabk. \'oter r.ypcs consist of pr<'f-
C'r<'nces as \\·ell as a cost of voting. He s ho\\'s that in large elections, if ,·oting costs 
arP non- ncgati \'C. there is all cq uili hri u m at tlH' social "·elfare optimum. "'hich tlll-
dn certain restrict i w conditions 011 1 he distribution of costs. is a g lobal c•quili bri um. 
\ lyerson (1991) extPnds Ledyard's r<'Sttlts in a model "·here the numhC'r of ,-ot(•rs is 
a Poisson random \'C::Uiablc. unkno\\·n ro the vot(•rs. He sholl's that as long as the 
densitY function of tllC' costs of 1·oring is positi\'(' at zero. there is a global C'quilibrium 
in Ledyard 's modPI as thP nttmbPr of \'otC'I's lwconH'S 1;-ngr•. The Led.ntrd modf'l. as 
ll'<'ll as \h·erson·s generalization of it. require that no voters h a,·e n<'gatiw costs of 
\'Ot ill g . 
1.2 Notation 
This SC'ction defines much of the not at ion used 111 the remainder of this ll'ork. c 
1. Topolog,·. Sc•ts. ('tC. 
\\'<'denote the• sPt of .\!-di mensional tTal vC'cto rs ll'ith all strictlY posit iw· entries 
l>y R:~1 " and l h{' ~{'! uf posi l i n• i 111 <'gc•rs l>y Z-r-r. 
L<'l _\ - lw <I sp<H·c• <lnd \ lH' ;1 topology on .Y . l n an alllls<' of notntinn. \\'<' denote• 
t h<' I3o r t'l CJ-alg<'hra of(.\.\) by B (.\). For au.\· set BE B(.\ ). thP indicatm· 
ju.11riion defiJwd b~· B is denoted hy l [B]. For any finite set Z. \\'e denot<' t he 
s<'t of p robabi lity distributions O\'Pr Z by ~(Z). lf _\ is a ll l<'tric s pace. \\'(' \Yill 
\\'l'i ll' II ·. ·II tu dcuot <' t lw UH't ric ou .\" . 
Gi\'('11 a pair of topo logical spaces _\ and ) ·. \\'i ll \\Tit<' C(.Y. ) ') to cl<'not<' the 
SC't of continuous functions taking _\ as th<'ir domain and } · as th<'ir raug<'. 
2. Com·crgrncl' 
\ \'hen discussing com·ergeuce. \\'(' usc ---+ to deuote pointw ise couwrgcnce of 
functions and~~ to dcuot<' \\'E'ak com·crgence of nlC'asures. ror any n ·al-n\ilt<'d 
function g taking as its domain a subset of a finite dimeusional EudidPan space. 
\H' adopt th<· uotation lilll g(.r) =:: if for any E > 0. there exists b(.:) > 0. such 
that for any point y satisf.\·iug l! .r - Yl <f.(.:) . lg(.r)- g(y)l < .: . 
1. \ "c•ctors and 1\latric<'s 
For a ny \'C'clor J' E !R'" . \\'C write .r = (.r 1 ....•. r"' ). Similarly. for any umtrix 
1 · E !R"' x JR." . \\'<' \Hite yj for the entry in t he i 111 row and / 1' colnllln. 
For any space_\ E IR111 • aucl a n.\· continuously d ifferentiable function f : _\ ~ JR. 
\H' denote the wdor of pa rt ial deri\·at in•s off \\·ith respect to .r by 
Df = (~!~ .... ·~)f). 
u.L' u./' 111 
a nd \\'rite D f( ::) \\'hen this \·c•ctor is <:>Yaluatccl at a poiu t :.: E _\ . Similarly, 
\\'C' \\·ill \\Tire D'2 f for th<' ntatrix of second order partial dcri\·at i,·cs off with 
rc'S]H'ct to .r. and D"f(:::) for tltc• <'Yillllation of this 11 1r1t rix at a point ::; E X . 
:..>. In tC'p;ration 
fo r any intcgrabl<• fun ction f and probability turasu re ¢ . <'acb d<'finccl on a 
topological s pac-0 .\'. \\'C' rknot<' til(' int<'g ral off \\'ith r< 'SJWCt to dJ on 1 · C _\' 
G 
by orre of rhf' following norarions : 
.l fdfL . 
. l f (.r )tL(d.r ). 
or 
\\"h0u } · = .\. we may drop the uota tio11 fo r the space over \\·hich integration 
is performed if the coutext is clear. 
-
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Chapter 2 Candidate Objective Functions 
2.1 Introduction 
Ganw t li<•on· wa:-. first appli\•d to t h<• :-.ocial sc i<'ll t'<'S 111 a 11 <•couorrtrc s <·t t ing ( ,·urt 
:\<•urnann and \l org<•ns t<•rn (19-l-l) ). so th<· qucs tiou of ,,·hid1 pa.nlfl' fun ctions ro us<· 
,,.,1s oft<•n simple. \\"hill' rlw rlehflte regarding \\·hat actual preferences owr ntouctar.\· 
rewards look like is st ill unresoh·cd. at kast the supposition that prden•nn·s a rc• 
\H•ak l ~· increasing in monetary rewards seemed u ncon t roversial. 
\\"hen political sci<'ntis t s started to apply ganH· th!'Or!'t ic modt'ls to th<' stud,· 
of el<·<·tious . Lhe isstH' of pa~·o ff fuunious bccauw won· corupl icatt•d. lt u\\·<·,·er. Ju 
particular. \\'bat should \\'(' assuul<' r hat candid a t ('S \\'i sh to maxi rui z<' as a result of 
th <·ir platform choice'? On th <' one hand. !'ach vote carri<'s equal weig ht ('.T out.r . so it 
seem s intnitive that a candidate m ay seck to maximize her \·ote share. In addition. 
tite r<' are other reasons, s uch a s .. utandatl' .. df!'cts . reputat ion b<•ndits in repeated 
C'!ections . a nd sign a ling ,·aluc to r!'C<'i\·ing more \·ot<•s in fln election (or poll ) \Yhich 
ma,· justify seeking to maximiz<' the• absolute amount of deuoral s upport. 
On t he o th!'r ha nd. tlw fi rst works in formal political theor\· assunt<•d that can-
didates were pme offic<• s<•<•k<•rs (s<'<' Downs (1931) and Dlack (1908) . for e•xampl(•) , 
intph·i ng that ca ndidat!'s should maximiz<' the proba bility of \Yinnin g t hP <'lection in 
a one-shot electoral m od el. The quest ion of equi \·alcnre is straight fonnucl : \\·hi rb. if 
am·. clifferem cauclidat<• objcctiws l<'a cl to ideutical optimal beha,·io r? 
\\. h ilc the q ueslion of cq ui n deiH"(' is iut er!'st iug for SC'\'Nal r!'asous. i ncl udi ng sont<' 
uorruatin• reasons . such as what t~·JH'S of candidate ohj<•ctin• hmctions !Pad to mon· 
··reprC'seutatin; · outcomes iu equi librium. there' ar<• se\·(•ral tech uical n•asons \\'hich 
moti\·ate our examinat ion. Firs t. much of the work on spariaJ com]Wtit ion (s<'e. for 
cxarupl<'. Hotclling (19:29)) was in an c•conomic cnvironm!'nt. \\·here t he analogu<' to 
candidates are firms s<·<'k ing to maximize profi ts. Thus . to apply the results of t his 
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11·ork direcrl.\· to politica l science. onr must assunl!' th<H c·;nHlidat(·'S wish t o ma ximize 
the number of \'Otes they each recci\·c. Second, the calculation of the cxprctccl number 
of \·otes is a much simpler operation than the calculation of t he probahilit\· of \·ictor~· 
in man~· models of electoral competition. FinaJly. e\·en if thr calculation of probability 
of \·icLory is uot difiicult. this fuuctiou is discontiuuuus iu I!Hlll\' elt~ctural lllOdcls iu 
\\·hicl1 the candidates· expected vote shares and expected pluraliti<'s arc continuous . 
..-\ s noted ahow. both Hinich (1911) and Ledymd (198-+) 1)1'0\'iclc> <'C]Ui\·al ence rr-
sul ts for elections \\·i th two candidates. Part of this chapter's mot i \'a t iou is to examine 
their resul ts at a deeper level. In particular. we examine the qm'stiou of best response 
cqui,·alcnce in general probabilistic voting models . \Yhile we find difficulties \vith re-
spect to both Hinich 's and Ledyard's results. uei ther Hinich nor Ledyard focused 
much attention on equi\·alence as their res ults did not depend on a ny type of equiv-
alence holding. Hinich 's proposit ion is merely a statement, as the paper 's principal 
finding (a one-dimensional spatial model in which the unique equilibrium is no t a t the 
mc>dian. but rather at the mean of the \'Oters · ideal points) is important regardless of 
\\·hat the candidates' objccti\·e functions are assumed to b e. Ledyard 's results also 
do not require an equi,·alence result to be considered important. 
2.1.1 Overview and Structure 
Section 2.2 se ts up a general model of \·oter l.Jelta\·ior wid1in single> vote . . iugle Inem-
lwr. simple plurality electoral system;;. Tinct• different candidate obj(•ctin~s. maxi-
mization of expected plurality. !llaximization of expected vote share , and maximiza-
tion of probability of victory, arc forlllally defined in Section 2.3. \Ve then pro\·icle a 
prelimimnv result \vhich states that expected \'Otc> and expected pluralit~· m aximiza-
tion a rc equi,·alent in all two candidate C'!cctions in \\·hich ab ten t ion is 110t allowed. 
The follo\ving sect ion. Sect ion 2 .-!. then formallv defines four types of cq ui \·alcncc: 
best n•spuuse and equilibrium equintlcucc in both pure aud mixed strategi<'s l.Jy the 
candidates. \\·e prove. for complet,cncss . a simple nesting result (Theorem G) \\'hich 
essc>nr ially s ta tPs t h<'l r lwst rc'SJH>nse eq 11 iva lcn(·p i m pi irs (•qu i l i hri 11m c·q 11 iva !PnC'<' he-
tween anv pair of objectiw function s. 
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SPrrion 2.5 conrnins one of om main results: f•stablishing sufficient conc!itions for 
best response equivalence to hold between all three objectiw functions (Theorem 13) . 
It turns out that our sufficient conditions are very stringent: there may only be two 
candidates. and each voter must act independently and. in expectation. identically. 
\\'e refN to auy electoral sy~teru iu which voter behavior satisfie~ our ~ufficieut coll-
ditions as possessing a repres<•ntatiw voter. Tlw remainder of Section 2.5.1 prm·ides 
Pxa.mpl<'s to show why thPs<' conc!irions <nf'. at least in somP srnsr, tight. 
In Section 2.5.3. we examine Ledyard's (198-!) equivalence result and provide an 
example' highlighting a difficulty with equivalence in 2 candidate elections in \Yhich 
abstention is allowed. In particular, the special role of abstention and its effect on 
the probability of victory by a front-running candidate are discussed. 
In Section 2.5.-! we examine Hinich's (1977) equivalence result. \\'e provide a 
counterexample to his claim which raises a difficulty with extending our sufficient 
conditions to his framework. 
Following the question of best response equivalence, \Ye examine the question 
of equilibrium equivalence in Section 2.6. 'vVe provide sufficient conditions for local 
equilibrium equivalence bet\\·een maximization of expected vote share and probability 
of victory in a broad class of models of electoral competition (Theorems 28 and 29) , 
furthering recent work by Duggan (2000) on the topic. 
Section 2.6.5 contains a discussion of necessary conditions for best rPsponse and 
equilibrium equivalence. \\'e utilize a notion of genericity for infinite dimensional 
spaces. shyness. due to Hunt. Sauer. and Yorke (1992), and recently generalized by 
Anderson and Zame (2000), to show that the set of electoral games in \\·hich the 
neces~ary first order conditions for eiLher type of equivalence are sati~fied is small 
in a formal, measure-theoretic sense (Theorems 37 and 38) . Section 2.7 contains a 
c!iscussion of possible generalizations and extensions of our rf'sttlts to other modPis of 
voter behavior and other models of electoral compPtition. Section 2.8 concludes. 
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2.2 The Model 
In this section we define thr framf'\YOrk 111 which we will cxaminr thr question of 
rqui,·alence bet\Yeen objectiw functions. 
2.2.1 Primitives 
Let . \' denote a finite set of voters. with IA'I = ,\". and :7 denote a finite sC't of 
alternatives (which may include both candidates and abstention, for example). ''"ith 
IJI = J. \\·e denote the set of candidates by J 0 c J. with IJ0 I = J 0 . Each 
candidate j chooses a policy. Xj E X, where X, a compact subset of a completE' 
and srparable metric space, denotes thr pol icy spl'tce. \Yr denote tlw .J0 -dimensiona.l 
,·ector of all policies by x, and the space of all such vectors is denoted by 1 · = X J o . 
The vector of all announced policies, other than the policy announced by candidate 
j. is denoted by x_J, and the space of all such vectors by L.J" \\·e denotE' the set of 
all mixed strategies for candidate j by Mj, the SE't of all profiles of mixed strategies 
by M = rr::1, and set of all profiles of mixed strategies for candidates other than j 
by .U 1 . 
Each voter i chooses one alternative, denoted by a, E J. The ,·ector of all choices, 
(ai··· . . a.!\·), is denoted by a. The space of all such ,·ectors is denoted by .4. Each 
candidate j possesses an obJectzve function uj : A --t JR. For any a E A and j E J, 
we denote the vote total of candidate j by v1 = 2:;:, 1 1 [a; = j]. 
Each candidate j picks a policy proposal Tj E X simultaneously. These choicPs arc 
thm ma(lr common knowledge to the voters. After obserYing the policy proposals. 
each voter votes for one alternative. As described above, this vector of choices is 
denoted b~· a. For any a E .-1, let w(a) E {.j E J lv1 ~ max1E..J u1} denote the winning 
candidate at s. In the case of a tie. the winner is assumed to be determined by a fair 
lottery between all candidates j for which vJ = max1E..7 v 1• \\"e denote the set of such 
candidates by H'(a). That is, \Ware examining a single winner, simple plurality rule 
system. 
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2.2.2 Voter B ehav ior 
Each voter i E .\' is characterizPd by a Tesponse funct-ion, p, : 1 · --7 :::,. (._1 ). Such a 
function represents the strategy of voter i. \\'e denote the probability an alternatiw 
j E J receives voter i's vote. cond itiona l on policy proposal n:·ctor 1·. hy 7},(r ). 
Throughout. we assume that each Pi(x) characterizes an independent multinomial 
random variable a,(T). This is stated formally below. 
Assumption 1 (Inde p ende nce) Cond-itional on a vector of polzcy proposals . . 1· E 
1 ·. the set of a, (x) are mutually independent random variables. each dislTibuted ac-
cording to Pi ( x), respectively, for all i E )\'. 
Finally. we define an electoral game to be any sextuple. I'= (J,J0 • • \., .\-,p.u ) . 
\ Ye denote the set of vectors of pure strategy !\ash equilibria to an electoral game r 
by P NE( f ) c 1' and the set of all I\ash equilibria by !VE(r) c M. 
2.3 Candidate Objective Functions 
We nO\\. use the set of p, to define three different candidate objective functions. 
expected ,·otc share, expected plurality, and probability of victory. For clarity, we 
first define these objective functions with respect to pure strategies by t he candidatps 
and tl1C'n extend these definitions to tllC' case of mixed strategies by the candidates. 
2.3.1 Maximizing Expected Vote Share 
Given opponents' pure strategies x _j, an expected vote share maximizing candidate 
j E J 0 seeks to maximize 
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whirh, gin'n Assumpt ion 1, rc>cluces to 
[\' 
1 "" . ' ;(x) = V L JY;(:r). 
- t=l 
(2.1) 
A fe,,· notes are in order. A candidate \\"ho seeks to maximize> vote share is. in some 
seuse, competing against all other alternatives - not just the other candidates. In 
particular. a candidate \vho seeks to maximize her expected vote share is also trying 
to increase the number of voters ,,·ho turn out to ,·ole for her. In addition. an expected 
,·ote share maximizing candidate is indifferent \Yith respect to the distribution of the 
YOtcs she docs not receive. 
2.3.2 Maximizing Expected Plurality 
GiY<'n pure strategies :r _1 by hf'r opponPnts, an expected plurality maximizing candi-
datP .i E J 0 seeks to maximize 
""hich, gi,·en .-\ssumption 1, reduces to 
(2.2) 
That is. an expected plurality maximizing candidate seeks to maximize the dif-
fereuce between her own YOte share and the maximum vote share received by any of 
the other candidates. Thus, expected plurality maximizing candidates are assumed 
to not care about beating alternatives \\"hich can not win the election anyway, such 
as abstention. This implicitly rules out nonstrategic alternat ives which can win the 
election. such as a choice of .. i\one of the above ... for instance. An expected plural-
ity maximizing candidate is also not completely insensitive to the distribution of the 
votes she does not recei vc. 
13 
2.3.3 Maxi1nizing Probability of Victory 
G iveu oppouen ts' pure strategies x _7 . a pmbalrdity of victo·ry maxiu~iziny candidate 
j E .7° seeks to maximize 
(2.3) 
2.3.4 Payoffs with Mixed Strategies 
\\"c now extend the abow objecti\·e functions to the case where candidates may 
use mixed strategies. This is a standard exercise, and is necessary only because our 
extension implies that candidates possess von Neumann-J\Iorgenstern payoff functions 
regardless of their objective. 
Given any candidate objective function u1 : 1 · ---7 JR. we will write 
for the expected value to candidate j of action 1:1 by candidate j. gi\·cn mixed strate-
gies /LJ ....• fLJ-l·ILJ+ 1 •.•. , fl.Jo by the other candidates. 
Similarly, given candidate objective function u1 : } ' ---7 ~' we will \nile 
for the expected value to candidate j of mixed strategy JL1 by candidate j, given 
mixed strategies JL 1 , .•• ,f11 1.JlJ+I· ... ,JLJo by the orher candidates. 
2.4 Two Different Definitions of Equivalence 
There a re at least two definitions of equintlent objective functiou. best response equiv-
akncC' and equilibrium equivalence. ThC' first. and most ckmanding, is best response 
equivalence. In words. best response rquivalencr holds whenever two objective func-
tions prescribe identical optimal strategies regardless of the strategy chosen by the 
opponent(s) . Best rPsponse N}llivalence may hold with rPspPct to all strategies or only 
with respect to pure strategies. 1 Such equivalence is essC'ntially a decision-theoretic 
concem , as t he strategic effects of other players' motivations are inconsequential to 
thC' player in question. 
Formally, we define best respouse equivalence in pure strategiC's as 
D efinition 2 Two payoff functions u, and u~ e.rhibit bC'st response equi \·alence 111 
pme strat egies for candidate i if, for all x_, E 1·_, , 
arg rna~ n.,(.r, .r _,) = arg rna?' 11.;(:r . .1· - i) . 
xe~ . xe ~ . 
Similarly, we define best response equivalence in mixed strategies as 
D efinition 3 Two payoff functions ui and u~ exhibit best response equi \·alence in 
mixed strategies fo r candidate i if. for all f.L-i E J1Li, 
arg max u;(f.L; . f.L-i) = arg max u~(f.L., f.L-;). 
Jl,EAJ, p, E AJ, 
A second , and weaker, form of equivalence, equilibrium equivalence, holds when-
ever the set of 0-"ash equilibria uuder t\YO differeut objective fuuctious a re ideutical. 
Just as with best response equivalence, we can speak of equilibrium equivalence hold-
ing \Yith respect to the space of all strategiPs. or just with respect to tlw set of purP 
strategy equilibria.2 
Formally, we define the t\YO types of equilibrium equivalence as follows. 
Definition 4 Two vectors of payoff fun ctwns u and u ' exhibzt equilibrium equi\·a-
lcnce in pure strategies if for all x E 1', 
x E PNE('u) ¢::? x E PNE(v'). 
1Since players possess von :\eumann-:'dorgenstern utility functions. then mixed strategy best 
response equi valence implies pure strat egy best response equivalence, but the reverse implication 
does not hold . as we show in Section 2.5.2. 
~As with best response equ ivalence. equilibrium equivalence in mixed strategies implies C'quilih-
rium equivalence in pure strategies. but the reverse implication does not necessarily ho ld. 
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Definit ion 5 Two vr.ctors of pnyoff functwns 11 nnrl 11 1 r..1:hihit Pquilibrium equin1-
lence in mixed strategies if for all J1 E M, 
J1 E .YE(u) ¢::> J1 E .YE(u'). 
ObYiously. both of these definitions are satisfied whenever best response equin1-
lcncc in mixPd strategies holds.:~ For complPtencss, ''"e pron• this formally. 
Theorem 6 Let r = (.J,J0 ,X,.f\',p,u) and f' = (J,.J0 ,X.JV,p, ·u'). Jf ·u and u' 
exhibit best response equivalence m mixed strategies. then u and u' exhibit equilib1·ium 
equivalence in mixed strategies. 
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that v and u' exhibit best response equiYa-
lence in mixed strategies but fail to exhibit equilibrium equivalence in mixed strate-
gies. Theu there must exist a profile, JL*, which is au equilibrium umler oue set of 
objective functions. say u, but \\'hich is not an equilibrium under the other set, v'. 
Then t lH•rc exists some candidate k for whom, given J1*_k and maximization of 71~. 
there exists a unilateral deviation. ilk # {L'i,. such that 
Then it is the case that the best response correspondence for candidate k under 
objecti\·e function u' does not contain Jl'k when Jl-k = J..L*_k. However, since Jl* is an 
equilibrium um.ler u. then the !.>est response correspondence for caudidate k uuder 
objectiw function u must contain J..L'k when Jl-k = J..L*_k. 
Thus. for candidate ]{ facing opponrnts' mixed stratrgy profile Ji*_k, 
contradicting the fact that u and u' exhibit best response equivalence in mixed strate-
gies. 
~For a more detailed discussion of this, see Aranson, llinich, and Ordeshook {197<1), p. 1<14-145. 
lG 
Si nrr s11 pposi ng that Pqnili hrimn Pqnivakncr in mixed stratcgi<'s (l<l<'s not hole! 
\Yhcn best response equivalence in mixed strategies docs hold leads to a contradic-
tion, it must be the case that best r0sponse equi,·alencC' m mixed strategies impli0s 
0quilibrium equivalence in mixed strategies. I 
The uext corollary follows immediately fr01n Theor0m G. It slates that best re-
sponse' equivalence in pure strategies implies equilibrium equival0ncc in pure stratC'-
gi<'s. 
Corollary 7 Let r = (J. J 0 . .\.. ;V, p, 11) and [' = (J. J 0 , X,}../ , p. u'). If 11 and u' 
exhibit best response equivalence in pure stmtegies, then u and u' exhibit equilibr-ium 
equivalence in pure strategies. 
Of course, the converses of Theorem 6 and Corollary 6 do not hold in genrral. 
\'evertheless, while equilibrium equivalence is a weaker criterion for equivalence, it 
is often '·enough'' for our purposes. since most analyses of electoral competition are 
solely concerned with (possibly some refinement of) \'ash equilibrium. 
\ \'c uow examine the question of w heu best response eq ui valeuce does (and docs 
not) hold between expected plurality. expected vote share, and probability of victory. 
2.5 Best Response Equivalence 
Spatial models of elections often assnllle t hat the caudidates' sole goal is ,·ictory. To 
calculate the optimal strategy for such a candidat<', one must take into account the 
probability of ,·ictory resulting from each strategy. In grneral. this probability is 
not a trivial computation, especially when studying probabilistic voting models (e.g., 
Hinich (1917), Coughlin and \'itzan (198la), ( l98lb), Ledyard (1984), and Chapter 
3 of this \YOrk). For this reason, r0searchers have sought candidate objectives which 
are easier to CO!llJ.>U te aud yet lead to the same prPdictiuus as those geueratcd by 
probability of victory. 
Thr Pxisting litPnlture has shown that eqnivalPncP rc~snlts do not hold in gerwral. 
In order to sho"· equi,·alence between maximizing plurality and probability of victory, 
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rhrf'f' things arf' asstmtf'd to hold. YotPrs c-hoicf's <HP mutually independ<>nt <'Ondirional 
upon the policy choices of the candidates, all \'OtPrs. conditional upon any policy 
profile .r, have identical expected beha,·ior, and candidate 's strategies are announced 
simultaneously. \Ye label the first two requirements independence and sym71lC'ir-y. 
re~pcctively. aud we descril>e auy electoral game which sati~fics lhe~e requiremt'llts 
as possessing a representative voter, since the expected behavior of any voter can lw 
inferred from the expected lwhavior of any other \'O t<>r. 
In Section 2.5. 1 we prove our main result , Theorem 13, which state~ that maxi-
mization of expected plurality. maximization of expected ,·ote. and maximization of 
probability of victory exhibit best response equivalence in any electoral game sat-
isfying lhe following condi lions: the electorate is finite, there are two candidates, 
abstention is not allO\\·ed. and the game possesses a representative voter. In Section 
2.5.3 we examine the issue of abstention in two candidate elections, the case exam-
ined by Ledyard. An example is provided which shows that Theorem 13 can not 
be extended to this case. Section 2.5.-l contains Hinich·s claim and a counterexam-
ple. Section 2.5.5 contains a discussion of elections involving more than 2 candidates, 
including an example showing that asymptotic best response equivalence between 
expected vote share and probability of ,·ictory i~ not generally true in such elections. 
2 .5 .1 2 Candidates, No Abst ention 
First it is shown that. for all N \\·ith J0 = J = 2. maximizing expected plurality, 1r1 , 
is equivalf'nt to maximizing f'Xpf'ctect mt<> shar<>. \ ~ -
P rop osit io n 8 Assume that J = 2 and Assumption 1 holds. Then , for any j and 
all x_1 . 
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Proof: By Assumption 1 nnd J = 2. 
[\' 
J~' L [pt(x ) - P?(.r)] 
t=l 
1 !'> 
N L [2pf(.T) - 1] 
t=l 
? N 
-~·[LPi( :r)J- 1 
i=l 
21j(x) -1. 
Thus, since the choice of candidate 1 is arbitrary. 1r1 is an increasing affine transfor-
mation of 1 ;. proving the proposition. I 
R e presentative Vote r 
\Yr no,,· restrict attention to elections which satisfy an admittedly stringent symmetry 
condition. In particular, we requi re for nll voters to have identical rrsponsr funct ions. 
Formally, we make the following assumption. 
A ssumption 9 (Sy mmetry) For all i, .i E."-· and all1: E ) · . 
.-\.s mentioned above, we describe any game with J = J 0 = 2 which satisfies As-
sumptions 1 and 9 as possess·ing a rep1·esentative voter, since Lhe entire electorate's 
expected behavior can be expressed as a fuuct iou of a siug,le voter's expected behav-
ior. In particular. we can drop the subscripts from the \·oters · response functions, as 
thry arc identical to one another. \ Ye formally define th is class of games below. 
D efinitionlO Any electoral game. f = (J,J0 ,.\.A', p,?.t) , in which the set of vot-
ers . . \·, is finite and the set of r-esponse functions, p, satzsfies Assumptions 1 and 9 
l.> sa·id to possess a representative voter. 
19 
\\"e nm,· shm\· that, in any electoral game with R finitP elPctoraJC' and possessing a 
represcutat ive voter. maximization of expected vote share. maximization of expected 
plurality. and maximization of probability of ,·ictory exhibit best response equivaleucC' 
in pure strategies . 
The following lem mata make the proof of Tlwore111 13 almost immediate. lu 
particular , Lemma 11 allows us to usc differential calculus to show that the probabilit~· 
of ,·ictory is a strict ly increasing function of <'XJWCtNI ,·ote \Yhen an PIPctoral gamC' 
with 2 candidates and no abstention possesses a representatiw voter. In a more' 
general sense, Lemma 11 ensures that the probabili ty of victory is a smooth func tion 
of the vector of all voters· response functions. 
Lemma 11 Let.;\' and J be finite sets. If Assumptwn 1 holds. then Rj(x) ts con-
tinuously differentiable in p(x) for all .7, for arbitrary values of J. 
Proof: Fix a vector of policy proposals :r E 1·. The probability of a vector of votes 
a E A is given by 
{\' 
f(a:p(.r)) = IJ p:'•(1·). 
i=l 
where a1 denotes the alternative recci,·ing i's vote \vhenever a is the vector of votes. 
The probability of alternative .7 receiving the most vote's is 
RJ(.r) = L I H"~a) l [l [.i E H' (a )]f(a:p(:r))]. 
aE.· I 
For any a E A. x E 1·. and i E . \ '. f(a: p(x)) is linear. and hence continuously 
differentiable. in p; . Since RJ is a lin<>ar combination of f(a;p(x)) for different values 
of a. it follows that RJ is continuously differentiable in p(1} I 
The next result. Lemma 12. states that thC' conditional expC'cted value of the 
upper 50% tail of the l>iuomial distribuliou is strictl.v positive. v\'e use this fact to 
show that the probability of ,·ictory is a strictly iucreasing function of expected vote 
share. 
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Lemma 12 FoT any positivP intPger 1\', 
(2.-!) 
where the inequality is strict for all p E (0. 1). 
Pmof: LC't .\ be' n. random varin.bk distrib.ntcd n.ccording to a Binomial(S. p ) disrri-
bution. Let Z = .\ - Np denote the mean zero standardization of.\. It is obvious 
that if p = 0 or p = 1 then Equation 2.-1 is satisfied \\'ith equality. Therefore. assume 
pE(0.1). 
First. supposing that p E (0, 1), t he expected value of Z can be rewritten as 
0, 
0, 
so that. dividing through by p(l - p), we obtain 
(2.5) 
:\Text, notice that, supposing that p E (0, 1), for all c < Np, 
(X) I'·; C pc(1 - p) - c(c- Np) < 0, 
,,·hile, for all c > Sp. 
(/\') . c p"(1 - p)N - r(c- Np) > 0, 
and . for c = l\'p, 
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Accorciingly, supposing that J) E (0, 1) . for all r < ;Yp. 
c:)pc(l- pr''-c(c- .Yp) < 0, 
Cv) . p(1- p). C pc- 1(1- p )!\-c-1(c- :Yp ) < 0. 
c:)]Jc- 1(1 - p )N- c-1(c- Np) < 0, (2 .6) 
while, for all c > .Vp, 
(~)pc(l- p)N-c(c _ Np) > 0, 
p(1 _ p). C~) ]Jc-1 (1 _ p )N-c-1 (c _ N p ) > 0, 
(~)Pc-1( 1 _ p)N-r-l(c _ Np) > 0, 
aud. for c = .Yp, 
(~}/(1- p)'"-c(c - Np) 0, 
(N) , p( 1 - p) . c p•- 1 (1 - p) N -c- 1 ( c - .V p) 0, 
c:)pc-1(1- p)N-c-l(c- Np) 0. 
\ Ye complete the proof in t\YO cases. The first case is when 0 < p :=:; ~. Combining 
Equations 2.5 and 2.6, we see that 
is a sum of nonnegativ<> (and at least one strictly positive) terms whenever p :=:; ~, 
implying the resul t in this case. 
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In tlJP final utsf'. 1 < 71 < 1. thf' sum 
is completely comprised of strictly negative terms. Rewriting this sum as 
implying that 
as desired. I 
Csing Lemmas 11 and 12, ,,.e can now prow the main result in this section. In any 
2 candidate election \Yithout abstention. a sufficient condition for expected pluralit:v. 
expected vote share, and probability of victory to be cqui,·alent is that the electoral 
game possess a representali H' ,.oler. 
Theorem 13 For any game possess·ing a Tepresentative voter-, 
Proof: Since \ j(r1 : :r_1 ) is a strictly increasing function of pl(r), it suffices to show 
that R1(.r1: .T _1) is also an inC'rf'asing funC'tion of p1(:r ). 
Lemma 11 ensures that we can differentiate Rj(x1 : x_1 ) with respect to ri'(:r). For 




where the final inequality comes from Lemma 12. Thus. the probability of ,-ictory 
is a strictly increasing function of the expected vote and by Proposition 8. a strictly 
increasing function of expected plurality. I 
Theorem 13 only gives sufficient conditions for best response equivalence. The 
following examples show that Assumptions 1 and 9. respectively. are not necessary 
for b<:'st response equivalence. 
Example 14 In this example. the individual response functions violate Assumption 
1. In particular, realizations of a, and a1 are perfectly correlated for all i, j E }./. \Ve 
show that, nevertheless, best response equivalence holds between all three objective 
functions . 
LetS= {L. R} b<' a bin ar~· policy space, J = J 0 = {1 , 2}. and N = 3. The vot-
ers' response functions are identical. but do not satisfy Assumption 1. In particular, 
the voters' responses are given by the following rule, where ai denotes the action of 
2-1 
nH<"r i. and o dPnorPs rh<" wrror of all a,. 
(1.1 , 1) if .T = (L.R) 
{ (1, 1. 1) with probability 0.5 if .1· = (L. L) (2, 2. 2) \vith probability 0.5 
a= 
{ (1, 1. 1) with probability 0.5 if .r = (R. R ) (2,2.2) wilh probability 0.5 
(2.2,2) if :r = (R.L) 
Thar is, in all statf's, tlw votNs votf' unanimously for onf' candidat<", and pr<"ff'r 
position L. 
Regardless of whether a candidate is maximizing expected ,·ote share. expected 
plurality. or probability of victory, the pure strategy L weakly dominates all other 
pure and mixed strategies. In fact , L is a best response for either candidate to any 
strategy chosen by her opponent under any of the three objective functions. Thus, 
best response equivalence holds in this case. cvC'n though Assumption 1 docs not 
hold. 
Example 15 In this example. the response functions do not satisfy Assumption 9. 
In particular. two voters ' behaviors are the ·'mirror image" of each other. while the 
third voter's beha,·ior is im·ariant to the policy chosen by the candidate. \\·e show 
that best response equivalence still holds between all three objective functions in this 
example. even though the game does not possess a representative voter. 
Let .Y = [0. 1], .Y = 3, J = J 0 = {1. 2} , and let the voters' response functions 





Thus. ,·orpr J's lwh <n-ior is complet<'ly unresponsin• to the policif's annmmc('(l hy 
the candidates. while voters 2 and 3 each are more likely to choose the candidates 
announcing the rightmost and leftmost policies, respectively. 
I t follows easily that the expected \'Ote share and expected plurality of either 
nwdidate is invariaut to the vector of policies chosPn l>y the caudidat Ps, with each 
candidate receiving an expected vote share of 0.5 aud an expected plurality of zero. 
I 11 calculating t h<> lwst response correspomlPnCf' for cancl idaJP 2 11 nd<'r maximization 
of probabili ty of victory, we obtain 
(0.5) [1- 2[xl - x2]2 + 2[xl - x2f] 
0.5 
for all choices of .1' 1 and x 2 , implying that a probability of victory maxumzmg can-
didate is indifferent between all policies. regardless of the opponent ·s strategy. Since 
this holds under all of the three ol>jecti,·e functions, best response equivalence holds 
in this model, in which voters· behavior docs not satisfy Assumption 9. 
2.5.2 Best Response Equivalence in Mixed Strategies 
\\'e now show that P\·en if Assumptions 1 and 9 are satisfier! in a 2 candidate Plection 
without abstention. best response equivalence in mixed strategies docs not necessarily 
hold. In particular, it is possible for a candidate to be indifferent between all possi-
ble pure actions under one ol>jecti, ·e function and not under another. implying that 
the best response correspoudence undt•r the first objective function coutains at least 
one totally mixed strategy while the best response correspondence under t he second 
ohjectin' function contains no such mixf'd strat<'gies. 
Example 16 This example shows that Let.\ = {n. /3. / }, J =:To= {1.2}, A' be 
finite. and assume that the game possesses a rcpresentatiw voter. 
Suppose that p(x 1.1·2 ) is given by 
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(\ !3 I 
Cl (0.3 .0.7) (0.3,0.7 ) (0.3.0. 7) 
8 (0.3.0.7) (0.3,0.7) (0 .3,0.7) 
'Y (0.9,0.1 ) (0.1) (0. 1) 
Taule 2.1: Expected \"ole 
First consider the case where N = 1. Jn this case, the probability of \'ictory for 
candidate one and expPcted votf' sharp arP ident ical, so that best rPsponsp equival<>nce 
holds trivially. !\ow consider the case where N is arbitrarily large. In this case. given 
Assumptions 1 and 9, the payoffs of au expected vote share maximizing candidate arc 
still given by Table 16. However, probability of victory maximizing candidates face 
payoffs given. for arbitrarily small c > b > 0, 
a. (3 'Y 
a. (c:, 1- s) (c: .1- c:) (c, 1- c-) 
3 (s.1- c;) (c:.1- c;) (c, 1- c;) 
I (1 - 6. 1) 0 0 
Table 2.2: Probability Of \ 'ictory, N Large 
:\O\Y suppose that candidate 2 is mixing \Yith equal probability between t he three 
policies. a.. (3 . and f. Then the expected vote share offered to candidate 1 by any of 
the three positions is equal to 0.3. However, the probability of victory offered by a 
and 3 is approaching 0. while the probability of victory offered by 'Y is approaching t· 
Thus. in large elections. the best response correspondence of an expected vote share 
maximizing candidate would contain a ll mixtures over .\4 , while that of a probability 
of victory maximizing candidate would only contain the pure strategy x 1 = 'Y· 6 
AsidP from its obvious role as a counterexampl<> to an extension of Theorem 13, 
Example 16 is also interesting for t he following reason. Hinich·s and Ledyard's results 
regarding asymptotic best response equivalence in pure strategies rc'ly on appeals to 
1lt can ue easily verifictl that the same is true for an expectetl plurality maximizing cantl itlate: 
simply s ubtract & from every payoff for both candidates in Table lG . 
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forms of thf' La,,· of LargP :\mnlwrs, whi le> Exarnplf' 16 shows that tlw samP logic 
actual!\· breaks equivalenc<.> in mixed strategies. 
2.5.3 2 Candidates with Abstention 
The previous section pro,·idf'd a theorem which strengthens Hinich's statement that, 
in two candidate elections without abstention and without coordination by \'Oters. 
maximizing plurality and probability of ,·ictory yidded equivalent strategies in <.>qui-
libriuru. As discussed in the conclusion. the proposition proved here for J = 2 is both 
weaker and strong<.>r than Hinich·s original claim, but it is ob,·iously concerned with a 
very special case, since abstention is grnerally allowrd in most elections. for example. 
\\'hen abstention is allowed, maximizing expected vote is generally not equivalent 
to maximizing plurality. as we show in Example 19. In this section, we provide an 
example of a 2 candidate election in which abstention is allowed and voters' behav-
ior satisfies both .-\.ssumptions 1 and 9. but maximizing plurality and maximizing 
probability of victory do not exhibit best response equivalence. 
Ledyard's Result 
Ledyard (1984) provides a rrsult stating that, when the numbP.r of votPrs is large 
enough. maximization of ''(.T) and R1 (:r) are equivalent when J
0 = 2 and J = 3. 
For clarity. ,,.e quote the claim, replacing Ledyard's notation with the concepts they 
denote in his model. 
If [the number of voters] is large. then [expected plurality] is a good ap-
proximation for a candidate to use in place of [probabili ty of victory] . 
. . . Since the [individual vote choices] arc independently identically dis-
tributed , it follows from a Law of Large :\umbers that ... maximizing 
[Candidate A's expected pluralit~·] maximizes (in the limit) the probabil-
ity that A wins. [Ledyard . (198-!), pp. 20-21.] 
Le>dyarrl prows his re>sult at tlw limit (i.E' .. an infinitP numlwr of votP.rs). which 
is never realized in his model. As the quote makes clear, Ledyard's a rgument is 
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that rxpertPd plurality is a good R.pproximR.t ion of prohahility of ,·ictory in larg0 
dectorates. \Ye are silent on this issue. \\'hat we now sho,,· is that the abstention 
can not be allowed in order for Theorem 13 to hold. The next example. due to .John 
Duggan, highlights why best response equivalence may fail to hold in 2 candidate 
l'lcctiou:, with ab~tcutiou, eve11 when the el ection 'f.JO::>sess u r·evres enlul·ive valeT. 
Example 17 This example shows how, ewn in a rwo candidate election. a significant 
change in expected total turnout can alter the candidates· probabilities of victor_,. 
"·ithout altering their expected pluralities. 
\Yc assume that voter behavior satisfies Assumptions 1 and 9. Let .V = 3. J = 3 . 
.!0 = 2. and consider t,,.o policy positions. x. y E ) ·, '"i th x = ( x 1 . .r2 ) and y = ( x~ . .r2 ), 
characterized by the following ,·oter bcha\'ior. "·here p(;:;) = (a . b. c) means that. given 
policy proposal vector z. the probability of any given \'Oter voting for candidate 1 is 
a, while the probability of voting for candidate 2 is band the probability of abstention 
is r: 
p(x) = (0.08, 0.02, 0.90) and 
p(y) = (0.53, 0.47, 0.00). 









ThP rPason rhat rhP two ohjPctiv<' functions ar<' nor c'quinll<'nr is that . conditional 
on any given voter showing up. the probabili ty of candidatt> 1 receiving that ,·oter·s 
,·ote is much higher at x than it is at y. I t is interesting to note that if x 1 and x'1 arc 
her only choices. candidate 1 has a strict incentive to reduce expected turnout if she 
wishes to maximize her probability of victory. 
2.5.4 Hinich's Result 
For 0\'er twenty years. the theoretical literature has been largely silent on the im-
pliC"ations of thr modrlcr·s choicr of candidatrs· objrctivcs. \\'r suggrst that a rr-
cxamination of this silence is necessary. 
First. t he validity of the claim in Hinich (1977) regarding asymptotic equivalence 
of maximizing expected vote and maximizing probability of victory in t\\·o candidate 
rlections is not obvious. For clarity. we quote the claim. 
If voters in a large Plectorate act independently. th<' distribution of a 
candidate's total vote approximates a normal distribution for Bernoulli 
trials. The mean of this normal distribution is the expected vote. Thus 
for large electorates. maximizing probability of ,·ictory is equi,·alent to 
maxirniziug expected votr. which is also equivalent to uwxim·iz·iny pluml-ity 
since everyone votes. [I-Iiniclt (19/7). pp. 212-213. Italics in original.] 
T h is claim has been cited by several authors (iuclucling Coughlin and ::\itzan 
(1981a), (1981b), Enelow and IIinich (1989) . and Ledyard (198-1 ), among others). 
Exactly when I-Iinich ·s claim holds is an open question, however. Theorem 13 slates 
that Hiniclt 's claim is corr<:>C't for fiuite electorates w lteuever tlt<:> game possesses a 
rrpresentative voter. \\'e now sho\\·. ho,,·e,·er. that it is not the case that best response 
equivalence holds in all 2 candidatt> electious without abstention. In particular, we 
construct an example in which voters· behavior does not satisf~· Assumption 9 and 
best response equivalence does not hold in any finite electorate. contradicting Hinich's 
result. 
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Example 18 This <'xnmplf' highlights tlw fnct that, f'Vf'n in a 2 candidatE' f' l<'C'tion 
,,·ithout abstention, best response equivalence between expected plurality and proba-
bility of ,·ictory can fail if voters do not satisfy our symmetry assumption. Assumption 
9. 
Let J = J 0 = 2 alH.l N = 3. Cousi<.ler au electiou iu which X = { L. H} au<.! voter 
behavior is rriven bv 0 . 
while 
and 
pf(L, L ) = PHL, L ) = p1(L, L ) = ~ 
pf(R, R ) = PHR, R ) = p5(R. R ) = t, 
Pt(R, L ) ~ 
p~(I?., L) 
3 






p~ (L , R ) 1 -c; 
p~ (L , R ) 
1 
4 +~ 
pj(L, R ) 
1 
= 4 +~ 
Consider the pure strategy profile (L. L ). :\'ote that this is a strict :\'ash equilibrium 
under maximization of expected vote share: 
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ancl. hy tlw symmetry of thf' votPrs · hPhavior. 
' ~(L,R) 
1 3 3 





' 2(L. R) < ' 2(L.L). 
Thus. by Proposition 8. (L. L ) is also an equilibrium unckr maximization of expected 
plurality. ::\ote that (L. L ) is a ::\ash equilibrium unc!er these objertiv<' functions for 
any E E [0. ±l· 
::\ow suppose that candidate 1 deviates toR. both her expected Yote and expected 
plurality decrease by c . but for her probability of victory is 
3 3 3 3 
E(-- c)(-- c)+ (1 - c:)(-- c)(-- c) 
~ 4 ~ 4 
3 1 1 3 
+E(-- .::)( - - c:) + c:( - - .::)(- - c:) 
~ ~ ~ 4 
3 ? 3 1 
(- - E)- + 2.:: (- - c) (- - c) 
~ ~ 4 
_2_ - ~-- + "2 + 2=-( 2_ - c + <"2) 16 2~ ~ ~ 16 ~ 
9 30 ? 3 
-- - E - C +2.:: . 
16 lG 
Given c: > 0. the difference between candidate 1·s probability of victory a t (R , L ) and 
32 
lwr prolmbiliry of victory at (L . L) is 
9 30 2 3 1 
- - -E - c + 2c - -
16 16 2 
1 30 ') 3 - - -[ - c + 2.: . 
16 16 
:'\o,v, letting.: get arbitrarily close to zero, "·e see that 
lim [R1 (R, L )- R 1 (L. L)] 
£-0 
lim [2_ - 30 c - .:2 + 2.:3] 




so r hat, for snffici0nt ly small posi tivC' valnC's of c, L is not a best response' for candidate' 
1 if candidate 2 chooses L. In other words. for sufficiently small positive values of.:, 
(L. L) is a :'\ash equilibrium under maximization of expected \'Ote share or expected 
plurality. but not a Nash equilibrium under maximization of probability of victory. 
This example can be extended to arbitrary numbers of voters. Assuming that 
J = 2 and N odd, assume that p;(L. L ) = ~ for all i, and take voter behavior to he 
such that 
PHR, L ) 
pi(R, L) N Nt-1 - E 
w· < ,\--1 v1 _ 2 , 
Vi> '\- 1 . 
Again. deviating from (L. L ) to (R. L ) decreases l>oth candidate 1's expected vote 
share and expected plurality by c, but increases her probability of victory. Indeed, 
denoting candidate' 1 's probability of victory by R 1 (c, .V). it can be shown that 
. . . 1 1 
lim lim R 1 (c: . N) = r;; > -. 
£-ON-oo ve 2 
Thus. even asymptotically, best response equivalence bet,veen the two objective func-
tions does not hold in general "·hen \'OtC'rs' l>ehavior fails to satisfy Assumption 9. 
I t should be noted that this example can be trivially extended to a larger policy 
33 
sp<!i'C' ( inC'lllding an intPrval of R To sC'c' this, just IC't L and R denotC' the endpoints 
of the interval , and give voters' linear response functions. It is easily verified that the 
remainder of the analysis remains the same: (L. L ) remains a ~ash equilibrium vote 
or plurality maximizing candidate \\'hile R is the b<'st response to L for a probability 
of victory maximizing candidate 1. 
~ote. as a note for our discussions later in this Chapter. that Example 18 also 
provides an example of a case where, in a 2 candidate election \Vithout abstention. 
probability of victory and expected plurality maximization do not even exhibit equi-
librium cquiYalcncc. 
2.5.5 More Than 2 Candidates 
Another open question regards elections between more than two candidates. ·wha t 
can '''<' say, if anything, about the r<'lationship between different incentives in such a 
fram<'\vork? T he next example. due to Tom Palfrey. shows that asymptotic equiva-
lence in our framework is not possible without more restrictions. 
Example 19 This example utilizes the fact that an increase in one candidate's ex-
pected vote share does not necessarily imply a decrease in every other candidate ·s 
f'XpC'CTCd \'OtC' share. 
Let the policy space be the unit inten·al, voters· preferences be Euclidean, and let 
there be three candidates. \Ve assume that voter behavior is sincere: voters vote for 
the candidate whose announced position is closest to the voter's ideal policy. \Ve also 
assume there is a continuum of voters. Assume that candidates 1 a nd 2, proposing 
x and y, respectively, are adopting identical strategies. Candidate 3 is adopting a 
strategy. ::, which is different from that chosen by candidates 1 and 2. As it stands 
no,,·, cand idates 1 a nd 2 are each receiving -15% of the vote, while candidate 3 is 
recei,·ing onlY 10% of the vote. The probability of victory for candidates 1 and 2 is 
also equal at this strategy profile. In particular, each candidate wins ha lf of the time, 
\\' hile candidate 3 never wins. 
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Asslllllf' nm\· tbar candidatP 1 SPPks to maximiz<-' hPr <-'XJW<'t<'d vot<' sharP and thar 
there <'xists a policy x ' such that. given y and z . she \\·ill recei\·e cl 1% of the vote at 
.r', candidate 3 will receive So/t. of the vote. and candidate 2 will recci vc 48o/c of t be 
vote. Thus. candidate 1·s vote share has increased. but her probability of victory has 
golle to zero, since candidate 2's vote share is higher than candidate 1 ·~ . 
This example sho\vS that. even with a continuum of \·oters. a candidate may 
incrPasP lwr f'XJWC't<>d votf> sharP but df'C' rPasP hf>r probability of \·ictory. This is 
generally the case when t here are more than 2 candidates. 6 
:'\ oticc that Exam plc El docs not violate cqui valence between expected plurality. 
as defined above, and probability of victory. The question of asymptotic equivalence 
between expected plurality and probability of victory with more than t\vo candidates 
is an open question , one which we discuss to some degree later in this chapter. 
2.6 Equilibrium Equivalence 
2.6.1 Introduction 
\\·e nO\\. extend the study of candidatt' objectiw functions to the question of t'qui-
librium equivalence. As discussed earlier, best response equivalence is essentially a 
decision-theoretic concern. as it is defined to hold regardless of the opponrnts· strate-
gies. Equilibrium equivalence. on the other hand. is a game-theoretic concern. Two 
objecti\·e functions arc said to exhibit equilibrium equivalence if the sets of :\ash 
equilibria under the two objecti\·e functions are identical. 
In this sectiou, we examine strict local ;'\ash equilibria - profiles of candidate 
strategies in which no candidate has an arbitrarily small deviation which leads to 
a wrakly greater payoff. Our motivation for <>xamining local equilibria is two-fold. 
Obviously. every global equilibrium is also a local equilibrium. If local equilibrium 
equivalence fails a t all local equilibria. then global equilibrium equivalence fa ils, im-
plying by Theorem 6 that best response equivalence must fai l as well. The following 
section pro\·ides a result which states that. for generic continuously differential>le 
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,·orC'r responsP functions. tbP first ord<'r conrlitions for local equilibrium equindencf' 
fail to be satisfied , implying that , generica lly. best response equivalence fails to hold 
between maximization of expected plurality and probability of , -ictory maximization. 
Secondly. the global equilibrium constructed in Theorem 46 in Chapter 3 is. in-
tuitively, a local equilil>riurn which ·'becomes .. global. Hence. it is hoped that a u 
understanding of the general properties of local equilibrium equiva lence will simult a-
n<'ously l<'<tcl to a.n undPrsta.ncling of tlw robustnPss of tlw Pquilibrium const ructPd in 
Chapter 3 to the specification of the candidates· objecti,·e functions. 
Our first result in this section is that interior p-symmetric stric t local equilibria 
under maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory 
arc identical whenever voters· types are independently distributed and the second 
derivative of each candidates' expected vote share is negative definite at the local 
equilibrium. \Ye show t hat local equilibria under maximization of probability of 
victory are also local equilibria under maximization of expected vote share even if 
we relax the local negative definiteness of the second derivative of each candidate's 
expected vote share to local strict cone a vi ty of each candidate's exp ected vote share 
with respect to her own policy choice. 
These positi,·e local equilibrium equivalence results are motivated by the results 
of several previous papers in probabilistic voting models of candidate competition. 
For instance, Coughlin and :'\itzan (198la), (198lb) examine local Nash equilibria for 
two candidate elections under a probabilistic voting model. a nd our results apply in 
much of their fra mework. as they require voters .. make independent voting decisions,'· 
\vhich corresponds to Assumption 1 in our framework. Additionally. our equi librium 
equivalence results apply to the framework studied by Hinich (19Ti). 
Similarly, in Chapter 3, we examine a model of strategic probabilistic voting with 
an arbitrary number of candidates S<'C'king to maximizP PxpectPcl margin of victory. 
\\·e prove the existence of a p-symmetric strict :\ash equilibrium at the point that 
maximizes the sum of the voters· utility functions whenever the number of voters is 
large enough. Our method of proof, using a Taylor Series expansion of the expected 
payoffs of a deYiatiou by any candidate). utilizes the fact that the point which wax-
3G 
imizPs thf' s11m of voters· utilitic>s is a local critical poim which lwconws a global 
expected payoff maximum as the number of voters grows \vithout bound. 
Finally. we prove that interior p-asymmetric local equilibria arc generically not 
equivalent under maximization of expected vote share and maximization of proba-
bility of victory whenever voters' behaviors are contiuuously difrereuliable. \ \ ·e show 
this by noting that the first order conditions for interior equilibrium are almost always 
not nwt simultmwously umkr thr two objective functions. 
2.6.2 The Model 
Let J . with IJ I = J. denote the set of candidates, as "·e do not deal with abstention 
in this section. and let }./, with I;VI = N, denote the set of voters. Each candidate 
simultaneously chooses a point in some policy space .\. \\"e denote the space of all 
J -dimensional vectors of policy proposals by 1'. 
\\'e write the action of voter i, given y E 1', as a; E J. and denote the number 
of votes received by candidate j by v1 = I { i E A')ai = j} I· \\'e write a for the vector 
of a, fo r all voters i and A for the space of all such vectors. Again, as above, ''"e 
denote the probability that voter i ,·otes for candidate j at y E 1· b~· pf (y) and the 
,·ector of all p{(y). for some candidate j and all voters i. by pl(y). \\'e \vill note any 
additional assumption we make about Pi as we need them. \\'e continue to refer to Pi 
as a Tesponse function for ,·otPr i . 
For any x E 1', let G1 (i . . r) denote the probability candidate j wins, conditional 
on voter i voting for j (i.P., o, = j) and lf't H 1(i , .r) denote t.hP conditional probability 
that candidate j wins. conditional on a, # .i. Formall~·, 
Pr{ w(a) = J IJL, (x); a, = j} 
L [ 1 n .~a) Pr{aiP-i(x); a,= j} l [.i E ll" (a)J] <LE A (2.9) 
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And 
Pr{ w(a) = jlx; p_,; a, -/= j} 
L [IW~a)l Pr{a lx;p_,: a,-/= .J} l [j E ll" (a)J]. 
aEA 
(2. 10) 
2 .6.3 Equilibrium 
\\'e use the notation from Section 2.6.2 to express the probability of victory for can-
didate j, given a candidate strategy profile x. as a sum over the voters. This sum is 
givPn in thP following !Pmma. 
Lemma 20 Given a policy profile, x E 1 ', the pr-obability of victory by candidate j is 
given by 
(2 .11) 
Pmof: Consider any voter i and any candidate j. From the definition of conditional 
probabilities and the assumption of independence, 
Pr[a, = j n w(a) = j] + Pr[a; -=1= j n IL'(a) = .J] 
Pr[a; = J] Pr[w(a) = .Jia; = J] + Pr[a, -/= j] Pr[w(a) = Jla; -/= J] 
JliG1 (i, .1·) + (1 - J~)Hj(i, .r). 
ThP rPsult thPn follows immec!ia.tPly hy snmming O\'<'r i. I 
Given Equations 2.1 and 2.11. the following lemmata state the first derivatives 
of each c:1,ndidate's expected \'Ote and probability of \·ictory with respect to her own 
strategy. respectively. 
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L emma 21 For any rlf'ctoral gam~ wil.h diffr.rr.ntinhle response funr:twns p. any r·r1.n-
didate j E J, and any policy pr-ofile x E ) ·, 
DT, 1 ~(.T) = L DT/V;(;r). (2.12) 
tE,\' 
Le mma 22 For any electoral game with differentiable response functions p . any can-
didate j E J, and any policy pmfile 1· E } ·-
Dx, R1 (x) = L bf(P- i(x))Dx,JJ;(.c) (2.13) 
iEN 
where G,(.i;x) and H,(.i;x) are defined in Equations 2.9 and 2.10. respectively. and 
thezr difference. c5f (p_, ( x)), equals i ·s pwot pr-obability with respect to candidate .i. 
Pmof : 
R1(x) L I H'~a)l l [l E H'(a)] Pr[alp(x)] 
aEA 
1 N 
L llF( ) I [l p~'(x) . 




For any mtf'r i E ;\'and any wctor of policy proposals .T' E ) ·. '£(=1 p:(.r) = 1. so 
that , for any candidat<' j E J, L_(=1 DJpj(:r) = 0. For any vot<'r i and any candidate j. 
let D (i:j) c A denote the vote vectors in which i is decisive (or pi,·otal) for candidate 
j: i.e .. all ,·ote vectors a such that a;= j. j E H" (a), and H" (apnme) and j tf_ H" (a' for 
przme c- - prtmP - - ) . l pnme -1. . R . . E . auyu = u 1, •••• a, 1,u, , u;+ 1, .. . ,aN Wltla -rJ · ewnt111g quatwn 
2.15: 
L l L L IT P~'(x) J [/\' [ [ l 
k=l z=l aE'D(i;l):LEII'(a), 1\'(a)j=k.a,=l j#z 
+ L [rr v;'Cx)] Dxt Pi(x) 
ai'D(i;j):LEII'(a).jW(a) =k,a,=l, rfi 
+ L [ IJ v;' (x)] D.L 1 p~· (x)]] 
aEA:LEII'(a),jll'(a) -k,a,#l ji:i 
(2. 16) 
For any voter i, any candidate j. and any vote vector a E A , a; =I j implies that 
a tf_ D (i; j). Thus, it is possible to combine the second and third inner sums in 
Eq uatiou 2.16 and o btaiu 
t. ~ [ t [•E1'(<1)1EU'~H'(o)J=k o,=l [g, p;' (x) l Dx,p:(x) 
+ L [rr P;' (x)] DrtPf' (x)]] · (2. 17) 
u\l'D(i; j):lEII'(u),j\ \ '(u) =k Jii 
For any \'Oteri E J\r and candidate j E J, let f(i:j) C _-\. _, denote the set of vectors 
of votes other than i"s in which j E l \"(A) and i can not be pivotal for j. That is, 
regardless of i's vote. H' (a) remains t hP samf' (and inclndPs j). Formally, 
D(i:j ) ={a _, E A , : j E W (a,;a_,)'v'a, E J}. 
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RP\\Titing Eqnation 2.17, 
t l [t [ 2:: [nP? (:r)] D,qp~(~·) 
k =l t= l a EV(i;I): IE II '(a ), IW (a ) l=k.n, = l J'P' 
+ L [t [rr JJ;1 (.T)l D x1P:n(x)]]j . (2. 18) 
a_,E f( i ;j):l ll '(a)l=k m=l jj:.i 
Since "J DJ·pm(x) = 0 fur anv i E A r and .x E 1', the second inner sum in Equatiou Drn = l 1. ~ 
2.18 vanishes, leaving 
t i [t [ L [rrP;J (.x)] Dx~P~ (x)]] 
k=t i= l a EV (i:l):IEII' (a), IW (a)l=k,a,=l Jf:.t 
t [ L [ W~a) [ [rr P;1 (x)] Dx,P~(x)] (2.19) 
t=l aEV(t;l ) Jf:.t 
The pivot prouability of voter i with respect to candidate l , given a policy profile 
X E 1 r and other voters' response functions P- i· is equal to 
(2.20) 
Csing Equation 2.20 and substituting 8.~ into Equation 2. 19, we obtain 
['; 
D.qRt(.7:) = L c5f(x)D.qp~(x), 
i=l 
as was to be sho,,·n. I 
vYe now define p-symmetric. local, interior. and p-interior vectors of response 
functions. In words. these conditions are fairl y s traight forward: p-symmetry holds 
whenever , at some policy profile 1· E 1·, a ll voters behave identically in expectation; 
l wo policy profiles x, y E } · are local if lhe distauce bet ween them is uot too great; a 
policy profile x E 1' is interior to 1· if it is not on the boundary of 1"; and a policy 
profilE' .T E } ·is p-imerior if no voter is voting for any candi rlat~ with probability 7.f'ro, 
-11 
C'onditionaJ upon .T !wing thf' announrf'd poliry positions. 
Our definition of p-symmetry is satisfied when. conditional on the policy an-
nounced, each voter's expected behavior is identical. That is , p-symmetry is a point-
\YiS(' satisfaction of Assumption 9, as used earlier in Section 2.5 .1. 
Definition 23 Given a vector of response functions, p, a policy profile y E } · zs 
p-symnwtric if, for all i. j E A' and all k E J . 
Any policy profile which is not p-symmetric is referred to as p-asymmetric. 
Two policy profiles are c-local if the distance between them is no greater than E: . 
Definition 24 Two policy profiles, x. y E 1'. are E:-local if 
Om methods of proof utilize the necessary first orcler ancl sufficient serond order 
conditions for optimization. In order to simplify the analysis, we examine interior 
equilibria - equilibria for which the necessary first order conditions are that the gra-
dient vanish. Perhaps ob\·iously. an interior equilibrium is any equilibrium in pure 
st rategies. x•, where x• is in the interior of } ·. 
Definition 25 A vector x E 1' is in the interior of 1 ·. written x E I nt(l") , if, for 
somes> 0, 
(liz- xll S c)=> z E } ". 
\Ye provide results for p-symmetric local equilibria at p-interi01· vectors of response 
functions. The reason for this restriction is that the partial derivatives of a candidate's 
probability of \·ictory \Yith respect to any \·otcr·s response function are functions of 
the other voters· response functions. Hence. p-in terior vectors of response functions 
-!2 
imply tl!flr thesP partial c:l erivaJives do not. vanish. 
D efinition 26 A vector of response functions p is p-interio r at a point .r E } ' if. for 
all voters i E ./\ ' and candidates j E :7, p{ ( x) > 0. 
\Ye now define a st r ict local equilibr ium of an elec tor al game. 
D efinition 27 Let f = (:J,:J0 , .\. ,.fv',p,1.t ) be an electoral game. let 2· E }'be a 
candidate policy profile, and let xj be any unilateral deviation by candidate j from 1· . 
Then x is a strict local equilibrium of r if there exists E:* > 0 satisfying the following. 
For all j E :7 and for all xj which are E* -local to x, 
with the inequality being strict whenever xj =/= x j. 
To simplify exposition, whenever we a re comparing t\vo electora l games r = 
(:J,:J0 , X ,.J\/,p,u) and f ' = (:7,:70 , .\.,JV,p.u'), \Ye will refer to the set of strict 
local equilibria of r and f' as being strict local eq uilibria under ·u a nd strict p-local 
equilibria under u', respectively. 
Finally. for any voter i . any policy p rofile .r E Y, and any given vector of the 
other voters' response functions, P-i, we will denote t he proba bility of a vector of 
other voters' actions, a_i E .4.-i· such that candidate j is either tied for t he lead or 
one vote behind the leading candidate by 6f(p_;(x)) . This p robabili ty is also referred 
to as the pivot probability and is dealt with quite extensively in Chapter 3. 
2.6.4 Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium Equivalence 5 
In t his section, we provide two re::mlts which, when taken t ogether, p rovide au insight 
into 'vhen local equilib ria under maximization of expected vote share and probabili ty 
of ,· ictory are equivalent. In essence. p-symmPtric local equ ili bria in which votPr 
beha\'ior is "concave enough" are equivalent. The p-svmrnetry condit ion can be linked 
51 a m extre m e ly g rateful to John Duggan for m a ny h e lpful comme nts on this topic, 
including the discove r y of a serio u s error in a n earlie r dra ft of this section. 
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tn the srifficierJt conditions found in ThPorem 1:3 - vot<>rs. at lrast locally. ··]ook tlw 
same·· to the candidates. Both of the main results in this section (Throrems 28 and 
29) generalize and closely mirror results (Theorems 1 and 4. respectiv0ly) in recent 
\\"Ork by Duggan (2000). 
Duggan (2000) examiues lite queslioll of eq uili bri uw eq ui \·alence bct\\·een ruaxJ-
mization of probability of victory and ·expected vote share maximization in 2 candi-
datr eirctions \\·ithout abstriJtiou. In particular, Duggan sho\\"S t.hat, in such rlPc-
tions, strict interior Nash equilibria under probability of victory maximization are 
also equilibria under maximization of expected vote share when the voters' types are 
independent. As for the com·erse, Duggan examines a general model of probabilistic 
behavior known as the addit·ive bia model, in which \"Oters ' types are represented by 
a utility bias in favor of one candidate or the other. He proves that the negative defi-
niteness of the matrix of second derivatives of the sum of the voters' utilit~- fuuctions 
is a sufficient condition for a strict interior :\'ash equilibrium under maximization of 
expecwd vote share to be a :\iash equilibrium under maximization of probability of 
victory. 
Our main contributions are to allo\\" for more than 2 candidates in both results 
and allow for a broader class of voter bPhavior in Theorem 29. 
\\"e now show that, if x* E 1" is a p-symmetric local equili bri urn under cit her 
expPcted vote share or probability of \'ictory maximization . then the negatiw defi-
niteness of 
L D'2V;(x*) (2.21) 
>EN 
for each candidate j is a sufficient condition for equilibrium equivalence. v\'e also 
show Lhat this condition can be relaxed to local su-ict concavity in each candidate j's 
policy position of 
L Pi(x*) (2.22) 
>E.\' 
for lorrd equilibria nncler probability of victory maximization to also he local equilihriR 
under expected vote share maximization. 
Theorem 28 L et x* E JRM be an interior p-symmetric strict local equilibrium under 
probability of victory maximization in which Pi (x*) > 0 for all voters i E .\- and 
candidates j E J and that , for each candidate j E J, the follo wing condition is 
satisfied: 
Lp{ (x*) (2.23) 
iE.Af 
is strictly concave with respect to x 1 in an open neighborhood of xj. Then x* is also 
a strict local equilibrium under maximization of expected vote share. 
Pr-oof: Since x* is au interior local eq uili briurn under maximization of probability of 
victory. then the following condition must hold for a ny candidate j E J. 
DRj(x*) = L[8f(P-i(x*))Dpi(x*)] = 0. 
zEAr 
The first order conditions for an interior local equilibrium under maximization of 
expected vote share are given by the following. 
D1 j(x*) = L Dpi (x*) = 0. 
iEN 
By p-symmetry. it follows that each voter is equally likely to be pivotal , so that 
8f(P-i(:I.:*)) = D~(P-k(x*)) for all ·i, k E Nand all j E J. Therefore, the first order 
conditions for local equilibrium under expected vote share are satisfied at x*. 
By the hypothesis that LiEN pf. (.7:*) is strictly concave in .7: j in an open neighbor-
hood of x*, :r:j is a strict local maximizer of 1 j (x*) in an open neighborhood of x* for 
all candidates j, implying the result. I 
If the second derivative of expected vote share is negative definite at an interior 
p-syrnrnetric policy profile x* for each candidate j, then a strict local equilibrium 
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11ndrr maximization of prob<1hility of vir.tory is nlso <1 strict loc<1.l f'quilibrium under 
expecwd vote share maximization. 
Theorem 29 Let x* E JRAI be an interior p-symmetric strict local equilibrium under 
expected vote rnaxzmzzatwn m winch J.i; (J.·*) > 0 for· all voters i E • \' and candi-
dates j E :J. If D 2 \ ~ ( :r* ) is negatzve definite joT all j, Lhen x* is also a ,c.;tTicl local 
eqnilibriurn under probab·ilzty of victoTy ma:~:imization. 
Proof: The first order condition for <1.n interior local C'quilibrium under expected \'Otc 
maximization is D\ j(x*) = 0, for all j E :J. To see that this implies the first order 
condition for local equilibrium under probability of Yictory maximization. DRJ(.r* ) = 
0 for all j E 3 , note that 
DR.)= oJ ·Dr}, 
where {!J is the .V x 1 vector of piYot probabilities for each voter with respect to 
candidat<> j. ancl Dpl is the .Y x M matrix of partial derivatives of each \'Oter's 
individual probability of voting for candidate .i, and 
D\j = Dpl. 
SincC' 6 > 0 by the interior nature of p, for all i E • V and of = 6~ for all \'Oters i. k E ;V 
and candidates j E :J, it follows immediately that 
(D \ ; = 0) {:} (Dpl = 0) {:} (DR1 = 0). 
A sufficient second order condition for local equilibrium under maximization of R 
at 1'* is the negative definiteness of 
D 2 Rj(x*) = L[Dof · DJY; + o: D2~], (2.24) 
tE/If 
\\·here Dti{ = Db{ for all i. k E . \' ancl j E :J by t hC' p-symmetr:v of :~:*. so that the 
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first tPrm on thf' RHS of Equation 2.2-1 disappp,ars ar :~:·.since LiEX DJTf = Dzrl = 0. 
Thus, by the fact that each \'Oter is equally likely to be pivotal. 
iE.V 
for any vowr k E Ai, so that D2 R1 is a positive scalar multiple of LiE,\' D
2pf. impl~·ing 
that D 2 R1 assumes the definiteness of LiE;\' D
2Pf. Finally, since 
D21~ = L D2pf. 
iEN 
it follows immediately that D 2R1(x*) assumes the definiteness of D
21j(x*). By hy-
pot hesis, D 21 j is negative definite, implying thr desired result. I 
A.n immediate question is what conditions on voter response functions would imply 
that D 21 ;(:r*) is negative definite? It turns out that a sufficient condition is local 
conca\·ity of each voter's behavior. coupled with the existence, for each candidate, 
of at least one voter whose beha,·ior at x* has a negative definite matrix of second 
partial derivatives with respect to that candidate's policy choice. The next lemma is 
straight fonYard. 
Le mma 30 Suppose that for all i E )\' and some point x*, Pi is concave zn Xj at x* 
for each j E J, and, for each candidate k E J. ther-e exists at least one voter- lk E /'-i 
for whom D2p~, (x*) is negative definite. Then D 21 j (.r*) is negative definite for- each 
j E J. 
Proof: Choose any candidate j. \\'e han' shown that the matrix of second partial 
derivatives of v1 is given by 
D 21j(x*) = L D'pi(x*) . 
iEA" 
The SIJm of nc>gatin~ sPmidefinitP mntricPs is nPgrltiw Sf'miclPfinite. and thf' matrix of 
second partial derivatives of a concave function is a negati,·e semidefinite matrix. In 
acldi tion , the sum of any nonnegative number of negative semidefinite ma tricPs and 
any positive number of negati,·e definite matrices is a negative definite matrix. The 
result follows immec.liat<'ly by uotiug that the choice of j is arl.>i trary. I 
2.6.5 Necessary Conditions 
In this section, we investigate necessary conditions for equilibrium equi,·alence and 
best response equi,·alence beh,·een maximization of expected vote share and maxi-
mization of probability of ,·ictory. \Ye examine necessary conditions for equilibrium 
equivalence first , as equilibrium equivalence is itself a necessary condition for best 
response equivalence (Theorem 6 and Corollary 7). 
Preliminaries 
In this section, we restrict attention to the case where X is a compact subset of a 
finit,e dimensional Euclidean space, IR.''1 , where JIJ is an arbitrary integer. \Ve first 
prO\·ide a technical result regarding a representation of voter behavior in our model. 
In particular, we characterize voter behavior as a point in finite dimensional Euclidean 
space. \\'e also retain the restriction that each p; is continuously differentiable on } ·. 
Given that '"e are concerned with satisfaction of first order conditions at some 
vector of proposals x E } ·, each continuously differentiable response function p; is 
completely characterized by a vector q;(x ) E :::.. (J ) x IR.J. For a given x E } ', the 
space of all such q1 (x) is denotPd by Q1 (.r) c JR.J(M + l). 
Formally, we define q; (T) as follo\\·s: 
q;(x) (p;(x), Dpf(x) . ... , Dpf (x)) 
( 
1 ( J Dpf (X) 
Pt x), ... ,pt(x), 8·1 , ... 
. 7 I 
CJpl( X) (}pi (X) 8pf (X) ) 
8xf1 , 0.?;~ ' ... , a:ry . 
That is. q; (x) is the concatenat ion of p;(:r ) and its deriva tives with respect to each 
candidate's policy proposal evaluated at x . This definition of Cfi turns out to be a suf-
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firic>n t parameterization of t ht' spac:e of continuously diffPrent ia hle rcsponsP funct ions 
to show that the first order conditions for equilibrium equivalence between maximiza-
tion of expect ed plura lity and probability of victory are generica lly not satisfied by 
vectors of continuously differentiable response functions. Given a ,·ector of response 
fuuctious p = {p 1 .. .. , PN }. we write q(x) = { q1 (x), ... , {ji\·(:E)}. 
The next proposit ion states that q(x) is a sufficient statistic for the first derivatives 
of both ex1wcred votP shmf' and probability of victory with respect to any candidate's 
policy choice. 
Proposition 3 1 Choose x* E I nt(l") and let p and p be vectors of continuously 
differentiable response fun ctions such that q(x* ) = q(x*) . Then 
• DRj(p(x* )) = DRj(p(x*)) and 
• D1 j(p(x*)) = Dvj(p(x*)) 
for all j E J. 
Similarly, it follows immediately that iftvvo sequences. {q (x)u } ~= l and {q(x)u}~= 1 , 
converge. t hen t he sequences of evaluations of each candidate's objective functions 
converge as welL since "\, j and R1 are both continuous functions of q. 
Generic Failure o f Equilibrium Equivalence 
The following results hinge on the fact that t he first deri,·ative of a candidate's ex-
pected vote share with respect to her own policy choice is a mapping from ~N to ~ 
,,. hile the first cleri vati ve of her probability of victory with respect to her policy choice 
is a mapping from ~2N to R 
For t he remainder of this section we restrict at tention to the case where t he 
response functions a re each cont inuously differentiable in X a nd show that the set 
of continuously differentiable response functions under which expected plurality and 
probability of ,·ictory maximization are equivalent is "sm all" in a precise sense. In 
particular. '"e show that the set of continuously differentiable response functions 
"·hicl1 yiPicl a g ivPn \ 'f'Ctor q is shy in tlw sparf' of continuously diffPrPntiahlf' rPspons<' 
fun ctions. First. hO\\·C'ver. WC' define a shy set. 
Definition 32 Let _\ be a complete rnetrizable topological vector space. A Borel set 
E C _\ is shy if theTe exzsts a reg·ulaT Borel probabilzty mcasur·e fL on _\ with compact 
suppoTt such that JL (E + :r) = 0 joT ev~TY x E _\. A (not n ecessar·ily Borel) subset 
F C _\ ·is shy if it ·is conto:ined in a shy Bard set. A subset } · C _\ is pnJvalent if 
_\ \ 1 · is shy. 
These defini tions of shyness and preYalence are due LO Hunt. Sauer. and York<' 
(1992). The notion of shyness has been generalized by Anderson and ZanH' (2000) 
to include a notion of relative shyness. For our purposes. for example . the set of 
cont inuously differentiable response funct ions turns out to be shy (since the ambient 
we tor space is the space of continuous response functions). Thus, we use the following 
definition of shyness with respect to another set. 
Definition 33 Let X be a topological vector space and let C c _\ be a convex Borel 
subset of X which is completely metTizable in the relati ve topology. Fix c E C. A 
BoTel s·ubset E C _\ is shy in C at c if for each 8 > 0 and each neighborhood ll' of 0 
m _\. there is a regular Borel probability measure fL on _\ with compact suzJpor-t such 
that supp {L C [6( C- c)+ c] n (H' +c) and {L (E + :r ) = 0 for· every x· E _\ . A subset E 
is shv in C ~fit is shy at each point c E C. A (not necessar-ily B orel) subset F C C 
is shy in C if it is contazned zn a shy Borel set. A subset 1 · C C is prevalent in C if 
zls complem ent C \ 1 · zs shy m C. 
A stronger Yersion of shyness is fimte shyness. as definC'd in Anderson and Zame 
(2000). For any finite dimensional subspace 1· c _\,we write )q· for Lebesgue mC'asure 
on \ ·. 
Definition 34 A Bord subset E C C is finitely shy in C if there zs a jinde-
dzmensional subspace 1· C _\ such that )q · ( E + x) = 0 for every :r E X. A (not 
necessnTily Borel) subset F C .\' is finitrly shy in C if it is ront.o:inerl in a .finitely shy 
B orel set. 
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Thf' notion of shyness extencls nwnsu re-t lworerir notions of gPneriri ty to inti nit<' 
dimensional spaces. Since the space of continuous response functions is infinite di-
mensional whenever _\ is infinite, we use shyness as our analogue for .. smallness"' in 
this space. 
\Ve denote the ::>pace of continuously differeutial>le response functions from ) · to 
~( .. 1) by Pd;1(1·. :J). This set is a closed subset of the space of continuous fuuctions 
C() ·.IRJ ). \Ve clenotP the spare of N-ciimensionnl vectors of rontinuously differentiable 
response functions by P{/;1 (l·, :J). 
Our next result states that, for any vector of policy proposals x E ) · any point in 
the ]-dimensional simplex, t 0 , and any ]-dimensional vector of ]If-dimensional real 
vectors l1, ... , tJ, the set of continuously differentiable response functions p for which 
q = t (i.e., p(x) = t0 and Dpl(x) = t1) is finitely shy in the space of all continuously 
differenTiable response functions. In words, the space of functions which satisfy a 
given first-order condition is '·small. '' 
Theorem 35 Let } · be compact. Then, given any i; E } · and any t E JRJ+J At. the set 
C(t) = {p: q(x) = t} 
is finitely shy in Pd~fp·. :J), th('; spar:e of contirw.ously di.fferentiabl('; rcspons('; funr:tions 
on 1·. 
Pmof: \\'e first ::>how that C(t) i::> a Borel ::;ub::;et of Pdifp· :J). 
Choose any countable dense subset X c I nt(X). By the continuous d ifferentia-
bility of p, if p(.i:) = k and Dp(.i) = L , where k E ~(:J) and L is a J x J real-valuec! 
matrix. 
. lp(x)- p(i)- L · (.r- i) l 
hm = 0. 
T-T ll:r- i ll 
Equi,·alently, for each ct E Z++: there exists /3 E Z_+ such that 
lp(x)- p(i)- L · (i;- i)l 1 
~~--~~--~~----~ < -
Jlr-.iJJ n 
for any .f E.\· such that 11 .1· - .r*l l < ~ ­
For any o. , (J E Z ++ and x E J\:., 
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. { . lp(i)- p(i)- L · (i- i) 1} 
C(t: a, J . r) = p E Pd;J(L J ) : IIi_ ill < ~ , 
which is easily wrified to be an open subset of Pd;J (} ', J ) . 
:'\ O\v let 
which, as the countable union and intersection of open subsets of Pdif p ·, J ). is a 
Borel subset of Pdifp·, .7). 
\\·r now sho,,· that C(t) is finitely shy in Pd,1() ·, J ). In order to sec this. choose 
::r• E ) • and define 
e<PIIxt-x"l e-<t>Jirt-r· l1 1 1 
h · ( T · ¢) = ( --:---....,.----.,.,..----....,- ) .r · ' 2(eo .r1-.r· I+ e-tl x1-.r · ) · 2(ec!>llx1-.r· J + e-¢1 '.rt-1:. I)' 2(J - 2)' · · · '2(J - 2) · 
(2.25) 
It is simple to ,·erify that hx-(· ; 9) E Pd,1p·,J) for a ll .T* E Int(} ') a nd a ll ¢ E R 
Let 
H = {hx·(x ; ¢): ¢ E IR} 
denote the one-dimensional subspace of C(} ' : IRJ ) which is spanned by hx· (x; cp ). Since 
en·ry element of His also an elemf'nt ofPd,1p·. J ), it follows that /\ff (Pd,1(} ', J) ) > 0. 
)Jo,v we must check that >.u (C(t ) +g)= 0 for any g E C(Y, IRJ ). It suffices to show 
that. for any g E C(} ·, IRJ ), (H- g) n C(t) is empty or a single ton. Suppose, by way of 
contradiction. t hat this were not the case. Then there would exist some g E C() ·.IRJ ), 
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somP distinrt rPI· (j)2 E JR. ancl SOlll(' C!istinct p 1 ,p2 E C(t) such that 
h(-;<PI)-g PI 
h (- : <P2) - g P2 · 
If this were the case, then it \YOuld follO\Y that 
(2.2G) 
Since. by construction, a ll four functions in Equation 2.2G are eYerywhere continuously 
differentiable in } ·. we can take the first deriYative of the first component of each of 
these vector-valued functions : 
D(pi(x*)- p~(x*)) 
0, 
contradicting the supposition that <PI I= cp2. Thus, (I-1- g) n C(t) is either empty or 
a singleton, implying that ).. 11 (C(t) +g)= 0 for every y E C(}-.IR.J). Thus, C(L) is 
finitely shy in Pd;1(1'. J). Since t is arbitrary, the result follows. I 
Theor<'m 35 statPs that the set of continuously diffPrentiable response functions 
which possess a given Yalue of q(i:) at a given point in i· E 1· is finitely shy in 
(i.e .. small relative to) the space of all continuously differentiable response functions. 
The next result strengthens this finding by shO\Ying that the set of continuously 
differentiable respouse function~ which, for a given point .7· E } ·, pos~ess a given value, 
p(.i") = p E ~(J), and wctor of derivatives. Dp(i) = cl = {Dpi(i), ... , DpJ (i:)}, 
(i.P., all rontinnously diffN<'ntiable Jl for \\·hich q(i) = (fj, rf)) is finitely shy in the space 
of all continuously differentiable response functions possessing a derivative equal to cl 
(i.e .. all continuously differentiable p for which q(i:) = (t. (l) for some t E !::.(J). 
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T heore m 3 6 CiN~11 any .i· E ) ·, any ji E ~( J ), and rwy rf E IRJ. t.hr set 
is finitely shy in 
B(d) = {p E Pd;J(l·, J): Dp(.r) = c/}. 
Proof: \\·e show that C(j5, d) is a Borel subset of B(d). Define 
C(t: d) = {p E P,hf(l·. J ) : q(i:) = (s, d), s > t}. 
and 
C(t: d)= {P E Pdifo·, J) : q(x) = (s, d). s < t}. 
where> denotes the usual partial ordering of IRJ. It is simple to see that C(t; d) is an 
open subset of B (d). Denoting the set of ]-dimensional vectors of rational numbers 
by Q. noting that the set of .!-dimensional rationals arc a countably dense subset of 
JRJ. and obserYing that 
C(p. d) = [nt>p,tEQ[C(t; jj)]] n [nt<p.tEQ[C(t; fJ)l] , 
we see that C(p, cf) is a countable intersection of open subsets of B(d). Hence. C(p, d) 
is a Borel subset of B (cf) . 
:.'\0\\' chooser= {r 1 .... ,r,v} E (P,Lt1p·,J))N satisfying 
r, p; and 
Dr, d; 
5-1 
for Hll i E {1. ... . S}. Ohviously, T E B (p) andrE C(j), rf ). :\f'xt, df'finf' 
h(r: t ) = (r 1 +t ..... rp.: +t). (2 .21) 
for all t E JRJ that sum to zero. That is. 
J 
t E T = { t E JRJ : L t, = 0} . 
i= l 
Let H (r) denote the one-dimensional subspace of C(1 ·, JRJ) spanrwd by h(r: t ) and 
A11(r) denote Lebesgue measure relative to H (r) 
Recall that 
• p;(x) E (0, l )J for all i E /1,- and all x E 1', 
• p, is continuously difff'rf'ntiahlf' for all i E _,\/, 
• 1· is compact, and 
• both J and.\- arc finite sets . 
Thus. there must exist C > 0 satisfying the following: 
c· = miq [min [mi~ [JJi(.r )J]] > 0. 
tEh JE.J :rE ) 
For all t in the following set: 
J 
f = { t E JRJ : "' t, = 0 , max t, < E.}, 
L ! <,<J 
t= l --
it follo\YS that, as defined in Equation 2.27, h(r: t) E P d,1 (1·, J) for all t E 'f. Fur-
thermore. Dh;(r; t) = d; for all t E T , so that h(r: t) E B (d) for all t E f. Since Tis 
a nonempty open subset ofT, restricting t toT determines an open subset of H (r), 
implying that Afi(r)(B (d)) > 0. 
For simplicity. let C = C(J3. rl) and H = H (r). i\ow we claim that >.11 (C +g)= 0 
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for any .fJC(} ·;JR.!). To ser this, it suffices to show tiHH 
(H -g)nC 
is empty or a singleton. 
Suppose. bv way of contradiction, that (H- g) n C has at leas t two clements for 
some g E C(l".JR/ ). Then, for some g E C(1-.IRJ), there must exist distinct s,t E T 
am! distinct u. bE C such that 
r+s-g a 
T + f- g b. 
This would imply that 
s- t = a- b, 
s- t 0, 
implying that s and t are not distinct. resulting in a contradiction. (Recall that 
s, t E JR.J, so that s- t = 0 implies that s; = t; for all i E J.) Since the supposition 
that (H - g) n C has more than one element results in a contradiction. it must be 
the case that (H - g)nC has at most one element. implying t hat .A 11 (C) = 0. so that 
C(ji, d) is finitely shy in B (d). I 
Theorems 35 and 36 together imply our main negative result concerning equi-
librium equivalence between maximization of expected vote share and probability of 
victory maximization: for any finite electorate, the set of continuously differentiable 
response functions which simultaneously satisfy tht• necessary first order conditions 
for local equilibrium equivalenc-r is finitely shy in t he set of continuously differentiable 
response functions which sat isfy tlw JH'CPssary first orrler conditions for expectPd vote 
share maximization. 
In particular. for any finite positive number of voters .V, any finite positive number 
5G 
nf crJndidatPs J. and any poinr .T* E lnt()' ), let P(:·(.T". J ) C P;~'f( i '. J) dPnotc• 
the set of .V-dimensional vectors of continuously differentiable respouse functions 
such that :r* satisfies the necessary first order conditions for local equilibrium under 
maximization of expectt>d \·ote share. \ ·.and let Pt'R(.1.· ·. J ) C P/':'( .r*. J) denote tlH' 
set of .V-dimeusioual vectors of coutiuuously difiereulialJlc· response fuuctious which 
satisfy thP necessary first order conditions for local <'quilibrium under both exp<'ctcd 
\'Otc' sharP maximization and maximizatim1 of probability of victory. R. at :r·. TltC' 
next theorem states that P{':.R(x* I J ) is finitely shy in P{ (x*. J ) for any fin ite .\' and 
any .r· E I nt(l'). 
Formally, for finite and positive .V and ] 1 compact.\. and any .1:* E Int (l.). 
P(:·(1··. J ) is defined as auy p E P[;';1p·, J) for which. for all j E {1, ... . .\'}. 
{',' 
D\ j(x*) = L Dpi(x*) = 0, 
·i= l 
and P{{(.T*. J ) is rlt>fint>d as any p E Pc~f(l'. J) for which. for all j E {1. .... 1Y}. 
{\' 
DRj(x*) = L bf Dp1(.r*) = 0. 
i=l 
Finallv pf':· (x* J) = P ·':' (x* J ) n P"' (x·* J) . • I ,R ' I • II · · 
Theorem 37 For· any finite, positive N, any finite. positive J , any compact polzcy 
space _\ , and any point :r• E I nt(l'). Pt,.R(':r*, J ) is finitely shy in P( (.r*, J ). 
Proof: Fix .V, J E Z -+ · choose any compact X C II~:" ~ and choose any :r· E l nt(l'). 
~ 0\\' st>lect any p E P{>' ( x* 1 J). \ \'e shO\\' that a ny collection of N - 1 voter response 
functions exactly pins down the necessary q;(x*) for the final voter i. \Yc consider 
voter .Y \\·ithout loss of generality. 
~ote that D~\'(1·") is uniquely det('nuiued by Dp-((1·" ), .... D1~\'- J(1·*) IJecam;c, 
sinc·c p E Pt'!(.r* . J ), it must be the case that, for each j E {1, ... , J}. 
2': Dz/.(:r*) = o. 
1E.\' 
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F11rthPrmorP. norP thnt p E P(YR(:r· . .J) impliPs thar. for Parh j E {1 , .. .. .!}. 
L o;(p_,(r"))Dzi; (x*) = 0, 
tEA' 
implying that the N 1h individual's probability of vot ing for each candidate j. ~y(:r*). 
is uniquely determined by p1 , ... . Pl\·- 1 and Dp{ (.1:*) , ... , D~. (.r•). 
Thus. given P-N, DvN(x") is uniquely determined for each j E J by the fact 
that .r• satisfies each candidate's necessary first order couditions for maximization of 
expected \'Ote share. Furthermore. this uniquely determines ~v(.r*) for each candidate 
j E J. Denote the determined value of Dr}N(x*) by d_N· and the determined value 
of V."·(:r·*) by P-N· \Yhere the subscripts emphasize the manner in which these Yalues 
are determined. 
Applying Theorem 36, it follows that the set of continuously differentiable response 
functions which satisfy both DJ~v(x*) = d_N and VN(x*) = P- N is finitely shy in the 
set of continuously differentiable response functions which satisfy D~v(x* ) d- N· 
The result follows by noting that the ordering of Yoters is arbitrary. I 
Theorem 31 statC's that intC'rior C'quilibrium equiYa!C'nce is an incredibly rare event 
with respect to distributions of voter behavior. Indeed. the result is stronger: '·critical 
point .. equivalence is a rare event. This result may seem alternatively surprising or 
expected, depending on how one views our parameterization of the space of response 
functions. One requirement we make is that voter behavior be p-interior and continu-
ously differentiable in .r - this rules out deterministic voting models, for example. We 
also do not require that behavior satisfy any normative properties, such as symmetry 
- one might think that pt(x. y) should equal pf(y, x). for example. Investigation of 
further restrictions on voter behavior is an important research topic for future work. 
In particular. if voter response functions are symmetric. theu the zero sum nature of 
candidate competition in the absence of abstention will lead to no candidate receiving 
as probability of victory. or au expected vote share, of less thau ] in a pure strategy 
equilibrium. A final point is that we do not deal with mixed strategy equilibrium 
Pquivalence. An invPstigntion of this quPstion might hP a worthwhile topic for futme 
58 
rPsParrh as m:•JJ. 
Generic Failure o f B est R esponse Equivale nce 
The next result, which follows immediately from Theorem 37. states that, so long 
as voter behavior is continuously difrerentiable wilh respect to the policy positions 
of the caudidates aud at least or1e candidate's best response correspoudeuce takes at 
least one value in the interior of.\ ,6 best response equivalence between maximization 
of expected ,·ote and probability of ,·ictory maximization will generically not hold in 
probabilistic voting models. 
T heorem 38 Let there exist at least one candidate j E .J and one vector of proposals 
by all candidates othe1· than j, i_1 E 1'_1. such that arg maxxEX '~(x1 ; X-J)n lnt(.\ ) =P 
0. Then, for any finit e integer n, any finite set of candidates .J and any compact 
policy space X , the set of n-dimensional vectors of continuously differentiable response 
functions for which, for all j E .J and all x _ j E ) '_ j, 
zs finitely shy in the space of all n -dim ensional vectors of continuously differentiable 
response functions. 
Proof : Consider a candidate j and a vector opponent 's proposals i;_1 for which there 
exists i 1 E I nt(X) such that 
(2.28) 
(The existence of such a candidate and vector of proposals is gua ranteed by hypoth-
esis.) B:v Theorem 37, it follows that the set of continuously differentiable voter 
6 T his condition seems mild , given the zero-sum nature of the dif[c rent objective functions , bu t 
we have not explored its implications to any extent. 
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r<'sponsf' funrtions undf'r wh ich 
(2.29) 
is finitely shy in the set of all continuously differentiable voter response functions 
satisf~·ing Equation 2.28. Since p, is continuously differentiable on )' for all i E .V 
and R1 is differentiable in p by Lemma 11. Equation 2.29 is a necessary condition for 
.. rj to lw a besl re~pon~e to i·_1 . The result follow~ immediately. I 
Thus. by supposing that a point is a best. responsr under rxpected votr sharP and 
assuming that ,·oter behavior is continuously differentiable in the policy proposals. we 
have sho\\"n that the set of voter response functions which satisfies the necessary first 
order conditions for best response equivalence between maximization of probability 
of victory and expected vote ~hare maximization is small in relation to lhe entire set 
of continuous voter response functions. It should be noted that this qualification is 
a k<'y point. Om arguments arP taking any continuous voter response function a.c; a 
possible form of probabilistic behavior. This assumption may or may not be justified 
in different areas of inquiry. For example, one may want to restrict attention to those 
voter response functions which are derivable from a traditional logit model of voter 
behavior with underlying single-peaked policy preferences (such response functions 
must intersect the centroid. for example). 
2. 7 Extensions 
There are several questions regarding candidates' objective functions which remain 
open. A few of these questions are what are the effects of different electoral institu-
tions on N].UivalencP betwPPn candidat.P objectivE' funrtions. what is th<> asymptotir 
behavior of candidate objective functions, \\'hat happens \\'hen candidates are uncer-
tain about their opponents' objective functions, and how are the behaviors of the 
voters affected by the objective functions of the candidates? 
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2.7.1 Electoral Rules 
Regarding electoral rule~, th i~ chapter has igrwred tlH' possibility of proportioual 
representation, multiple winners, multiple ballot systems (e.g., simple majority rule 
systc>ms with runoffs or party basf'd systems wit h primar·if>s), ancl c!iffc>rent scoring 
rules such as approval voting and the Borda count. A positive result which is not 
particularly surprising is that maximizing probability of victory in a pure (i.e .. one 
\Yithout a minimum vote threshold required for representation) proportional repre-
sentation ~y~tem i~ equiavent to maximizing expected vote ~hare. lnve~tigatiug how 
the optimal strategies under different candidate objectives change as the electoral 
system is c:hangec! is not only a very interest ing topic, but also seemingly tractahlf'. 
2.7.2 Asymptotic Equivalence 
Th0 issue of asymptotic equivalence has been broached earlier in this chapter in ref-
erence to the works of Hinich (1977) and Ledyard (1984). \\"e have shown in t\\"0 
examples (Examples 19 and 18), that asymptotic best response equivalence may not 
hold in electoral competition. Further. boLh examples can l>e shown, in a straight for-
ward fashion . to be robust in the sense that the parameters of each may be perturbed 
and retain the failure of best response equivalence. However, we have not proYided 
any general results about asymptotic equivalence of candidate objectives. \Ve have 
not done so for several reasons, of which at least two should be noted. 
First. the question of asymptotic equivalence is muddied by at least one significant 
issue: ,,·hat exactly does one mean by asymptotic? In what way does one assume that 
the electorate grmY larger? Secondly, it i~ not clear what the notion of asymptotic 
equiYalence actually means. 
Both of these issues lead to a number of some,vhat promising routes for futurf' 
work. \\"ith respect to the first issue (hmY does one assume that larger electorates 
are generated) . one might examine the behavior of the three payoff functions when a 
given electorate is replicated without bound. or when each voter's response function 
is drawn independently according to some distri l>u tion on the space of possi l>le re-
Gl 
sponsf' functions. Tlw posirivf' resulrs prf'Sf'ntf'rl in th is chapter regarrling Pquilihrium 
equivalence may be used as leverage in such a research project. \\"ith respect to the 
second issue. one might consider several definitions of asymptotic equi,·alence. A. few 
<>xamples include (1) the existence of a finite number such that, for all electorates with 
llHH"e than this number of voters, o11e or more of the notions of equivaleuce defined 
above holds. (2) best response funct ions converge asymptotically, or (3) some subset 
of thP Pqnilihria (if they exist) undf'r t\vo objective funcrions in the sequf'nce of gamf's 
with finite electorates converge asymptotically. 
2.7.3 Strategic Import ance of Objective Functions 
If we as researchers are uncertain about the true motives of candidates. then it seems 
reasonable to suppose that at least some candidates are unsure as to their opponents' 
true motivations. Is such uncertainty important? For example, will diiTerent equilib-
ria appear in electoral games iu which caudidates mu:;t account for the fact that their 
opponent may not care about winning, per se, but rather attempt to maximize his 
or her Yote total. conditional upon victory? A preliminary intuition is '·probably," as 
''"e haYe prO\·ided several examples of situations in which the incentiYes of candidates 
differ considerably under maximization of expected \"Ote share and maximization of 
probability of victory. This question of electoral competition with incomplete in-
formation about opponent's payoff function:; is a very prornbing avenue for future 
research. 
2.7.4 Voter B ehavior and Preferences 
Finally, an important quf'stion concf'rns the behavior of votrrs. In particular, the 
incentives of voters are usually assumed to be with respect to the implemented pol-
ic~·. \\"e have assumed that voter beha,·ior is taken as given by the candidates and is 
im·ariant to the candidates' preferences. \ \"e do this for two reasons. The first reason 
is methodological- one of Lhe motivations for the study of equivalence is a nalytical - if 
objectiYe functions are equivalent. then the analysis of a model under t he assumption 
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of onP objPctin'! function is. in thP appropriatP sPnse. snfficiPnt mutlysis of tlw saJllP 
model with the equivalent objective function. The second reason is that in many 
cases it is assumed that voters' preferences are defined over outcomes. and therefore, 
after the policy announcements are made, the voters are playing a subgame amongst 
themselves- one in which the candidates have no further role. In some sense, the pol-
icy announcements are assumed to have been handed down from outer space. \ \'bile 
this is a pessimisric view of thr role voters play in the campaign, it is analytically 
tractable as \vel! as serving as a useful benchmark case. This is not to say that future 
research should not examine the implications of voter behavior and preferences which 
are not invariant to candidate objective functions. Indeed. if the candidate incentives 
under two different candidate objective functions are not identicaL then the incen-
tiw•s and abilities of voters to affect candidate behavior under each of the candidate 
objective functions may differ. 7 
2.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter. we have attempted to make se,·eral contributions to the formal theory 
of elections. The first of these is to point out that a rigorous statement and proof 
of Hinich 's (1977) claim that. asymptotically, maximizing plurality and maximizing 
probability of victory yield equivalent strategies in equilibrium in two candidate elec-
tions without voter abstention is not as obvious as might have been assumed. This 
is important if only because the claim has been widely cited in the literature. \Ve 
also provide a counterexample to the claim in order to show the need for further 
im·estigation into the topic. 
The second contribution concerns two candidate elections. It is shown in Theorem 
13 that. regardless of the number of voters. maximization of plurality and maximiza-
tion of probability of victory arc equivalent objective functions (i.e., they yield iden-
tical best response correspondences) in two candidate elections without abstention 
when voters· behaYior satisfies Assumptions 1 and 9. 
7 1 thank Richard ~lcKelvey for pointing out this issue. 
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:-\.s stateci ParliPr. ThPorpm 13 is in somP rPspPcts wPakf'r. and in oth0rs srrongN. 
than Hinich ·s original statement. Hinich 's claim does not require our symmetry condi-
tion, Assumption 9. On the other hand, Hinich 's claim is asymptotic, ,,·hile Theorem 
13 states that the best response functions are identical for any number of Yoters. 
\Ye ha,·e also provided sufiicient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence be-
tween expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory. 
By Pxtc>nd ing arguments d uP to Duggan (2000), \\' P haw shown t lmt ··conc~wP Pnough ·· 
aggregate voter behavior is a sufficient condition for local equilibrium equi,·alcnce 
between these objective functions. Conversely, '"e have shown that the set of contin-
uously differentiable voter response functions which exhibit local equilibrium equi,·a-
lence is a "small" set of continuously differentiable response functions . That is, local 
equilibrium equivalence is nongeneric. In particular. we have shown that the set of 
continuously differentiable response functions which lead, at a given vector of pro-
posals. to local equilibria under both objective functions is small relative to the set 
of continuous!~· differentiable response functions which lead to a local equilibrium at 
that same point under maximization of expected vote share. 
Finally. \Ye have shown that, generically, best response equivalence does not hold 
between maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of 
victory in single member, simple plurality elections without abstention. This follows 
from our genericity result regarding equilibrium c>quiYalencP. In particular. if local 
equilibrium equivalence does not hold, then best response equivalence does not hold. 
G.J 
Chapter 3 Voting in Large Elections 1 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter im·estigates properties of Quanta! Respouse Equilibrium (see :\IcKclvey 
and Palfrey (1995), (1998)) in spatial voting games. The Quanta] Response Equi-
librium (QRE) is a theory of behavior in games that assumes that indiYicluals get 
privately observed random payoff disturbances for each action available to them. The 
QRE is then just the Bayesian equilibrium of this game of incomplete information. 
In a QRE, although voters adopt pure strategies, from the point of view of an out-
side observer who does not know the payoff disturbance, the players choose between 
strategies probabilistically, choosing actions that yield higher utility with higher prob-
ability than actions that yield lower utility. The probability that one act ion is chosen 
over another is based on the utility difference between the alternatives. 
In this chapter , we work in a Bayesian framework, as in Ledyard (1984), and take 
into account the game theoretic considerations for the Yoters, but unlike Ledyard, we 
assume that voters have privately observed payoff disturbances associa ted with each 
action. Our only restrictions on preferences are that they are uniformly bounded . 
Further, we consider multi candidate contests. But our results basically extend those 
of t he earlier literature. \\·e find that for large enough electorates there is a conver-
gent equilibrium at the alternative that maximizes social welfare. For two candidate 
contests. t he equilibrium is unique. Our equilibrium is global, as in Lin, Enelow, 
and Dorussen (1999), bu t in our model, the conditions for a global equilibrium are 
satisfied by allowing the number of voters to grow large rat her t han by assuming the 
utility shock becomes large. 
The main contribution of this research over the previous work is to obtain a global 
1This ch a p ter is jointly a u t h ored w ith R ich ard McKelvey, w h o acknowledges t h e 
financial support of NSF grant #SBR-9631627 to the Cali fornia Inst itute of Technology. 
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canrlidfltP PquiJihrium in largP rlectorates with wry littlE' in thE' \Yay of a.c;s11mptions 
about Yoter preferences. The main difference between our a pproach and previous 
,,·ork on probabilistic voting is the way in which we model the probabilistic Yoting. 
As in (198-1), by treating the Yoter decisions as a game, we explicitly include the piYot 
probalJility in the voters' expected utility calculations. lu large electorates, lJecause 
the probability of being pivotal goes to zero. the expected utility difference between 
any two canrlirlates also goPs to ?.Pro. Thus. nnrler the QRE ass11mpr.ions, the votrr's 
choice is determined mainly by the candidate specific payoff disturbance. Hence. in 
aggregate. voters vote less based on policy, and more based on candidate attributes 
as the size of the electorate grows. IIo,,·ever, even though individuals become less 
responsive to policy differences, in large electorates, since the total number of voters 
is also getting large, there is still enough policy YOting at the aggregate level to force 
the candidates to the social optimum. 
3.2 The Mode l 
\Ye assume the existence of a finite dimensional policy space, X ~ Rm, where X 
is bounded, and finite sets .V and f{ of voters and candidates, respectively. Write 
11 = INI and k = IKI for the total number of each. We let 0 indicate abstention, and 
write I\o = l\. U {0} for the set of candidates plus abstention. 
\\·e assume that for each voter, i E N. there is a space Ti of possible characteristics, 
or lypes of the voter. Wrile T = IlENT;. 'vVe assume that T; = T x (RI<o)T is 
partitioned into two parts, representing the policy and consumption based parts, 
respect ively. and that T is a complete separable metric space. Voters' preferences 
over the policy space are described by a utility function, u : X x T ---7 R. Hence, 
the utility of voter i E N, of type t, = (T; , rJi(T;)) E T, for the policy x E X is 
u(.r, T,). Assume that the distribution of the voter i's types is given by an atom-less 
probability measure of full support, p,, over the Borel sets of T, , and that the joint 
distribution is given by p. We assume that pis absolutely continuous with respect to 
the product measure TI,EN Pi· Note that this implies that certain well-behaved types 
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of corndation bf'tweP.n the distrihution of rypes for different \"Of<'rs are allmwd in rll<' 
model. 
\\"e assume three things about the distribution of prderences. First. ,,.e assume 
tha t u is uniformly bo·unded with respect to 1V , i.e., there exists a D E ~ such that 
for a ll .1: E X and T E T. lu(.r , T)- ·u(y, T)l < D. This is essentially a restriction 
that rules out sequences of voters possessing arbitrarily strong policy preferences. In 
addition, uniform houndedness woulcl follow from c.ontinuiry of 11 and compactrwss 
of X and T. Second, we assume that. for any set of voters J\' , there exists a unique 
policy. x · E .\ , which maximizes the expected sum of voters' ut ilities. Third , we 
assume t he existence of a number J/ satisfying the following for all S: 
(3 .1 ) 
This assumption rules out preferences which become arbitrarily '·diverse" in relation 
to the optimality of a ny particular policy. Unfortunately. this restriction rules out 
some plausible preference profiles. On the other hand, we only need this condition 
for the final results of the Chapter. Tlworem 46 and Corollary 41. 
For notational simplicity. \Ye drop the argument of r)i(T,), and just write TJ; when 
there is no confusion. Also, 1/tj is used to represent the/" component of IJ;( T;) . All 
of the TJ;J fori E N, j E K 0 , and T, E Tare assumed to be independently distributed 
absolutely continuous random variables with full support. each with a cumulative 
density funct ion that is twice continuously differentiable. vVe assume that the TJ;.i(T;) 
are identically clist ributed for all i E l\' , j E I\ , a.ncl Ti E T. Howf'vf'r , we a.llow for TJ;o 
to have a different distribu t ion than 7],1 to allmv for costs or benefits of voting. Any 
joint distribution ponT satisfying all of the above conditions is said to be admissible. 
Let J1 be the common mean of 7],1 for j E J\. Jlo be the mean of 7]to, and c = J1 - JLo. 
Then c is the expected cost of voting. 
\Ve now define a game. in \vhich the candidates each simulta neously choose policy 
positions in X and then, after observing the candidate policy positions, the voters 
,·ote for a candidate. Thus, the strategy set 1 i for candidate i E ]( is 1 ~ = X , and the 
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SC't of stratpgy profiles for t h<> Crtlld iclates is ) . = n ,E 1\) ~ . The> strategy set s, for \'Otc>r 
1 E .Y is the set of functions s,: 1' x T, --7 l\-0 , and the set of strategy profiles for the 
voters isS= DiEJ\·S,. \Ye use the notationS_;= Dn';S1 , and s_, E S_, to represent 
strategy profiles for all voters except voter i. with similar notation for candidatPs. 
Given a strategy choice y = (.1)1 , ... , Yk ) E ) · of thP caudidates, and s = ( s 1 •.•.• sn) E 
S of the voters. define for any j E I\0 , and t E Tn 
\ j(y, s; t) = ~ l{i E I\': s;(y, t; ) = j}l 
n 
(3.2) 
to be the proportion of the vote for j. and 
H'(y. s; t) = {j E I\: j E argmax(\/(y , s; t))} 
IE/,· 
(3.3) 
to he the set of winners of the election. For any J ~ I\ , write 
P1 (y , s; t,) = Pr[{L; E T_; : W (y. s; t) = J}]. (3.4) 
to be the probability of a first place tie among the candidates J. ·we assume that a 
fair lottery is used to select a \Yinner \Yhen there is a tie, so that we can define voter 
utilities over subsets J ~ I\ by 
(3.5) 
The payoff to voter i E .V of type t, 
defined to be: 
( T;. ry;) from the strategy (y, s) E } · x S is 
U(y, s. t,) = L PJ(y. s; L;) · VJ(y, T,) + 1J.s,(y,t,) 
J t; 1\ 
(3 .6) 
In other words, a voter voting for candidate j = s,(y, t;) receives the expected utility 
of the policy of the winning candidate, plus a payoff disturbance 7J1j that is associated 
with the \·ote, j E I\0 that the voter makes. We write U(j; y. s, L;) = U(y, (j, s_,); L;) 
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for thP utility tbat votpr i of typP t , gPrs from voting for stratPgy j. gin•n y. and s_, E 
S_,. Since P1 (y , s; ti) is a function of ti only through s,. it follows that PJ ( !J. (.j, s_,): t i) 
is independent oft; . So we write P1 (y, (j, s_;)) = P1 (y. (j, s_,); t; ). Then. we can 
write for all j E K 0 , 
where 
(! (j; y , S . T;) + 1/ij 




is the expected utility to voter i of type T; of voting for candidate j. unconditioned 
on the payoff disturbance, T/ij · 
It follows from McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972) that the difference in the expected 
utility of voting for j over abstaining can be written in the fonu: 2 
U(j; y. s. T,) - D(O; y. s, T;) = L o{k(y. s) . [u(yj, T,)- U(Yk· T,)] (3.9) 
kof-j 
\vhere c5~k(y, s) is the pivot probability for j over k: 
Jk( ) - ' 1 ( 0 qj ) D; y, s - . L . DT qJ + IJI - 1 
J,k EJ r;, J, 
(3. 10) 
"·here we use the shorthand q) = P.1(y , (k, s_i)) . The pivot probabili ty is the proba-
bility that by voting for j rather than abstaining, voter i changes the outcome from 
a win for k to a \vin for j . It then follows from Equation 3.9 that the difference in 
2Equation (3.9) follows by reversing the orrler of summation in the expression for (E1 - E 0 ) of 
thr Theorem on p. 49 of (1972). 
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PXpPrrPd 11tility of voting for j over I is: 
C(j; y, s, Tt)- O(l; y, s, T,) 
which, for the case of t\YO candidates, I\= {j.l}. reduces to 
(3.13) 
To define the candidate payoff functions. we first define l ; (y, s) to be the expected 
proportion of the votes for candidate j at the profile (y. s): 
l j(y,s) = Et[l j(y,s;t)J = ~Et[ l { i E I'l': si(y.ti) = j } IJ 
n 
(3.H) 
Then we define the payoff to candidate j to be the margm of expected victory 1;, 
defined by: 
fj(y.s) = 1j(y,s)- max l {(y , s) 
IE.V-{J} 
(3.15) 
R e m a rk 39 Anv voter with unbounded utility \YOuld be subject to the St. Peters-
burg paradox: If xk is chosen to satisfy u(xk, T,) > 2k, for k = 1. 2, ... , t he voter 
would not trade the lottery that gives prize xk with probabili ty ;}r; for any x. Simi-
larly. if the xk satisfy u(:1:k, Ti) < -2\ they would 11ot accept the lottery for any x. 
Thus. bounded utility for any one voter is implied if the voter is not subject to the 
St. PPtPrshurg paradox. T he un iform honndedness condit ion reqnir0.s further that 
there be a common maximum and minimum bound across all voters. 
R e m ark 40 ::'\ote that our assumptions do not preclude atoms in t he marginal dis-
tribution of p over T. The requirement that p be atomless is automatically satisfied 
via the assumptions that are imposed by admissibility on the d istribu tion of the 7]t's. 
Thus. our assumption of admissibility of p encompasses on the one hand the classical 
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fnllllP\mrk. in which all votPr idPal points arP known and common knowiPclgP. and 
on the other hand. models such as that of Ledyard. in which all voter types are in-
dependent and drawn i.i.d from a common distribution on voter types. The classical 
frame\YOrk arises if we let the marginal distribution of p on T be discrete. 
Remark 4 1 The assumption that the distribution of the T)t1 are i.i.d ,,·ith respect 
to voters is an implicit normalization of utility functions. This is important in inter-
preting the main theorem, since the weights that individuals arc given in the social 
utility function is determined by this normalization. 
3 .3 Voter Equilibrium 
In this section, we consider the voter equilibrium to the game defined by equation 
3. 7 conditional on fixed candidate positions, y E L Since the candidate positions 
are fixed, the strategy space for the Yoter reduces from S; (the set of functions s; : 
}" x T, --7 K 0 ) to the set of functions of the form s,(y, ·) : T, --7 K a. We \\Tite S;(y) 
Lo designate this conditional strategy space. and S(y) Lo designate the set of profiles 
of conditional strategies. 
For any fixed y E } ·, we define a voter equilibrium for y to be a pure strategy 
Bayesian I\ ash equilibrium (BNE) to the voter game defined by ( 3.7) over the strategy 
space S(y). This is any profile. s E S(y), in which voters always choose an action that 
maximizes expected utility conditional on their type. Thus, s is a voter equilibrium 
for y if for all i E N, t; E T, and j E 1{0 . 
:;;(y. t;) = j ¢::? U(j; y. :;. t;) =max U(l; y, :;, t;) 
IEKo 
¢::? U(j: y, s, T;) + TJ;j = ma_x [O(l; y, s, T;) + TJ;t] 
IE/,o 
(3.16) 
:\ote the structure of the payoffs is exactly the same as used in l\IcKelvey and Pal-
frey (1998) in defining the agent quanta! responsP. Pquilibrium (AQRE) for extrnsiw 
form games. So as long as the distribution of the errors, TJ,1 is admissible, a Bayes 
:\'ash equilibrium to the voter game is exactly the same as an AQRE to the game. 
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.\'otP f11rthPr that in any \'Oter equilibrium for y. PXCPpt on a sPt of nwasun' zpro. th<' 
strategy si(!J. ti) depends on i only through ti. So we can drop the subscript on s 
without loss of generality. 
P roposit ion 42 For any y E }', there exists a voter equilibrium for y. 
Proof: This is a game of incomplete information, \vith action spaces A; = I\ a and 
typP space T, for each i E /\'. The action spaces arP finite. and the distribution of types 
is independent across individuals. Thus, we can apply Theorem 1 of l\Iilgrom and 
\\'eber (1985) to conclude that there exists an equilibrium in distributional strategies. 
Further, since the distribution of player i's types, p., is assumed atomless, it follows 
from Theorem 4 in the same paper that the equilibrium can be purified to be in pure 
strategies. I 
Of particular interest is the average behavior of a voter i of type ti , after integrating 
out TJ,. For any s,(y, ·) E S,(y), define si(y, ·): T --7 ~Ko, as the marginal distribution 
of s; with respect to ry.; for any Ti E T and j E K 0 , 
(3.17) 
\\'e ha\'e assumed that the 'liJ are independently distributed, for all i, j and Ti, 
and identically distributed for all j E I\. Let H(-) be the cumulative distribution 
function of ry,. i. e., H(w) = Pr[ryi1 ~ w1 for all j E K 0] for wE 3tKo. And let G1 (-) 
be the cumulative distribution function of ( E 3tK, \\·here ( 1 = 7lit- 7lij for l E I\- {j} , 
and Zj = 7Jio - 7lij. Thus, 
(3.18) 
for any:: E ~K. Cnder the assumptions we have made on the 77iJ' for all j E K, both 
H (w) and G 1 ( z) are twice continuously differentia ole and strictly increasing in all 
arguments. and everywhere positive. Thus. if sis a Bayes l'\ash equilibrium, applying 
f'(JIJation (3. 16). for j E !\. 
s,(y, r,)(j) Pr[U(j; y. s, r,) + 17.1 = ~~; [G(l; y. s. r,) + r~z,]] 
Pr[7Jit- 17.1 :::; U(j; y, s, Ti)- O(l; y, s. r,) for all l E 1\o - {j}] 
(3 .19) 
where V 1 (y, s, r;) is a vector iu ~,,. with components V{ (y. s . T;) = U(j; y. s. r;)-
U(l; y. s . r,) for l f; j, and U~(y, s, r,) = U(j: y, s. Ti)- U(O; y , s. T;). 
Example: One example of the abO\·e is the logit .-\QRE. \Yhere the density functions 
of 1r0 = T}io + c and w1 = 17.1 for j E /\. follow a type one extreme \·alue distribution. 
H1 (w1 ) = exp[ - exp[->.w1]]. Thus. \vith independence, \Ye ·have H(w ) = ITj H1 (w1 ) . 
This leads to the logistic formula Gj(z) = l+ .x( +· )~2:: (.X·)' In this case, for exp c -; ,,.J exp -1 
fixed >.. we get: 
Si(y. Ti)(j) 
1 
1 +exp [>. · (c +C(O;y.s,r,) - [".(j:y,s.r,))] 
+ Lt¢ J (exp [>. · ([;(!: y. s. r;)- [.:(j ; y. s, r;))]) 
and in the case of two candidates, where I\ = {j.l}. 
1 
si(y, T;) (j) = - ----------------
1 + exp (>. · (c + bJ1(y. s) · [u(y1 , r,)- u(yt, r,)l)) 
+ exp (>. · (bJ1(y. s) + bU(y. s)) · [u(.y1 , r,)- u(y1, r;) l) 
\\'e nO\Y show that for fixed candidate positions at y E 1', and for any voter 
equilibrium, that all pivot probabilities go to zero and the probability of voting for 
any two candidates in /\. becomes equal as n --7 oo. The reason for this result is 
simple: one's vote only matters when it is pivotal.3 Thus, one·s vote only matters 
3 The logic of p ivotal voting i ~ explained in the voting literature . See e.g .. Myerson and Weber 
( 1995). 
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"·Jwn thP othPr \·otrrs arf' C'ith<>r PWn ly splir hf'twrrn thf' rwo top randidarf's or wh<'n 
the vote difference between the two top candidates differs by one vote. As n grows 
large, this becomes a very low probability event. Thus, in general. one's vote doesn't 
make a difference very often. This implies that voters effectively become indifferent 
with re~pect to which caucl idate they vote fo r as n ---+ oo. \\·e fo rmalize the al>o\·c in 
the followi ng proposition: 
Proposition 43 Assume v. is unifor·mly bounded. Fix y E 1·, and for each integer 
n. let pn be any admissible joint distribution over Ili= 1 T,, and let S 11 be any A Q RE 
for the voters. Then for any j,l E J\- and i. k > 0, 
Further. in all cases. the convergence is uniform. I. e .. for any c > 0, there is an n F.: 
S'UCh lhalfoT all i,k,j,l,y,p11 .Sn ifn > nF.:, of1(y,s11 ) < c , ~6~ 1 (y,s11 )jO~l(y,s11 ) -11 < 
c, and si(y, T;)(j) - si(y, T,)(l) <E. 
To prove the proposition. we need a Lemma. 
Le mma 44 Fix c· > 0. and let zn be the set of sequences Z 
independent random vectors Z; E ~K of the form 
(Z1, ... . Zn) of 
where a 1 is the jth unit basis vector in ~I\ , and p E ( .6 Ko r .5atisfie.s p,1 2: c• for all 
i . j. For any J <;:; l \ -, define 
BJ = {z E ::::,/\: z1 = :-;k > Zt for all j, k E J , l ¢ J}. 
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Writr. Z = Li Z,, and rlr;finr. 
(3.20) 
Then for any J t;:: J( with IJI 2: 2 
(a) lim,_00 8}* = 0 
Pmof: An element Z = ( Z1 , ... , Z.,) E zn consists of independent, but not identi-
cally distributed random vectors, aud is characterized by a vector p = (PI · ... ·Pn). 
\Yhere p, = (PiO· Pzl, ... , Pu\) E ~ 1\o. The mean of Z, is J.li = (Pil, .... Pi I\) which 
ronsists of all hut the first romponPnt of p. Pick Z" = (Z\, ... . z;;:) E 2" to attain 
the maximum in Equation 3.20. Since Pr[.Z E BJ] is continuous as a function of p, 
which ranges over a compact set, it follows that such a o:r and Z" exist. Define l ~' 
to be the variance covariance matrix of Zi') and xr = zr - J.l,. Set ' ;, = ~ L i '~' 
and T~ = l ~- 1 . From our assumption that P·ij > c· for all j E I\0 , it follows that l ;, 
is strictly positive definite and hence invertible. Then 
b"* Pr[Z" E BJ] 
Pr [ Li Z0 - Li Z[k = 0 for j, k E J. and l 
Li Z0 - L i z~ > 0 for j E J, l rf. J 
Pr [ ,L, (-~~- -~~) = ,L, (Pik- Pi1 ) for~- k E J , and l 
Li (-\,1 - _\tl) > .L, (Pil- Pi1 ) for J E J.l rf. J 
= Pr [ 1,=, L i (-\}j- XJ'k) = ~ ,L, (Pik- Pi1 ) for j, k E J, and l (3.21) 
1,=, L , (Xf1 - XJ) > ~ L, (Pit- p,j) for j E J.l rf. J 
But no\\" the Xi' form a triangular array where each random variable Xi' has zero 
mean , and for each n, the Xi are independent. Further, writing Qi for the cumu-
lative density function of X ;', the random vectors satisfy the following multivariate 
15 
Linrlr/)('rg condition : For every f > 0, 
(3.22) 
To sec this, note that z;' is in the simplex .!),. f{. Hence, IIXi'l l :::; 2. The probability 
that Z~ = 1 is p,1 ~ £* . Further, the variances and covariance of \ ~" are all uniformly 
bounded away from zero and one, since Pi) ~ E* for all i . j. Thus, t he same "·ill 
be true of 1 ~· So 1 ~ \vill be invertible, and for any t:. we can pick large enough 
n so that IITnX, II < fyn. So each term in the summation of Equa tion 3.22 goes 
to zero with n. which establishes (3.22). It follows by the multivariate version of 
the central limit theorem for triangular arrays (see Bhattacharya and Rao. (1986), 
Corollary 18.2, p 183) that the distribution of )nTn ,L, XI' converges weakly to a 
multivariate unit normal distribution. Hence the probability it falls in a subset of 
any lower dimensional subspace goes to zero. Thus, when 1.11 ~ 2, the right-hand 
side of Equation 3.21 converges to 0 ,,·ith n. I. e., limn-co on· = 0 . proving (a). To 
prm·e (b), we note that B 1 · describes a lower dimensional subspace than B 1 . Hence, 
an argument similar to a bove shows that for all sequences. the Pr[.Z E Dr] goes to 
zero faster than Pr[.Z E B 1 ] establishing the result. I 
\\'e uow proceed to a proof of the proposition. 
Proof: To prove (a), define D = 2 · (IJ\1 - 1) · SUP.r.,y.r [u(x, T)- u(y, T)], and € * 
= minjEF\G1(-1 · D ), where 1 = (1. ... , 1) is the un it vector of length II\ 1. By the 
assumptions we have made on the ry;1, c· > 0. Then from Equation 3.9. using the 
fac t that c5f1 :::; 1 for a ll i, j. k,we have - D :::; C(j; y. s, T,) - U(l; y, 8. T;) :::; D for all 
j,l E I\ , which implies that s;(y,Ti)(j) = G1("U1(y,s,T,)) ~ GJ(-1 ·D) ~ c· . 
~ow. given auy sequence T = (T1 , .•. ,T11 ) with T, E T for all i > 0. define the 
random variable 
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ThC'n, lt?tting (0, s~,) be the profik ,,·here tllP Yot.er i a.bst<tius, and (j, s~,) be rh0 
profile where voter i votes for candidate j, we have. from Equation 3.10: 
8jl( n) """ 1 ( 0 q~ ) 
l y. s = . L . TIT qJ + I .!I - 1 
J,kEJr:;_J, 
But. from Equation 3.4, for auy J ~ K , 
P1 (y, (0, s_t)) = Pr[{Lt E T_,: ll' (y, s; t) = .!}] 
Et_, [W(y, (0, s~t); t - t) = .1] = Et_, [2: Znt(Tt) E BJ] 
lytt 






where the inequality follows from the definition of 8J* in Lemma 4..! . A similar ar-
gument shows the second term in Equation 3.23 is less than or equal to 8';-. Thus, 
o;1(y,::;n) ~ LJ.kEJr;l\ (Jil-l) 8)* ~ ('LJ,kEJr;K 1/-1) 8"*. where 8"* = maXJr:;_l\8~* 
By Lemma 44. limn-oo on* = 0, which proves (a). Since t;n• is independent of i, j, l, y, 
the convergence is uniform in all arguments. 
To show (b). for each J ~I\, we can write P1 (y, (0, L;)) = Et_, [ Llyei Znl(TL) E BJ] 
the corresponding expression for voter j is P1 (y, (0, s_j)) = Et_1 [ LL yej Zn1(TL) E BJ]. 
I3ut the RHS of these two expressions differ only by the i and /h terms, and hence, 
by Lemma 44, both converge weakly to the same multivariate normal distribution. 
Heuce. in the limit, the ratio of the two must approach oue. The same argurneut ap-
plies to all terms in the sum in (3.23). Thus. the result follows. A similar a rgument 
snffires to est<tblish ( r) . 
To show (d), we have from Equation 3.17 that 
s7(y. Tt)(j) = Pr[mJX C(l; y. s", T,) + 1/il ~ U(.j: y, sn, T;) + 1/z;]· 
lr-J 
No"·· in the first part of the propositiou we showed all pivot probabilities go to zero 
uniformly as n gets large. Hence, using Equation 3.12 we get t hat as n --+ oo, for 
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j, IE/\". C(l: y, sn. T,) - C(j; y. 8 11 • T,) -7 0 uniformly in i, j.l, y. T. Bnt th<'n \VP gPt 
lim [s~(y, T,)(j)- .s:'(y. T,)(l)] Pr[max TJza - 7],1 :S 0] - Pr[max TJw- TJ,L :S 0] 
n-oo a#J a#l 
= G1(0 ) - G1(0) = 0. (3.27) 
Since the convergence of O(l;y,sn,Ti)- O(j;y ,sn .Ti) is uniform in all arguments. it 
follows that the convergence' in Equation 3.27 is also. I 
Based on Proposition -13 (b). it follows that for large n, we can ignore the ,·oter 
subscript on 6. and writf' 6f1(y, .c:;n) = li11(y, sn) = 61J(y, sn). Furtlwr. from Lf'mnu1 ..J.-L 
it follows that in any voter equilibrium, all ties involving three or more candidates "·ill 
be small in relation to the two candidate ties. Recall the notation qy = P1(y , (k , s_i)) . 
Then for J <;:; f , 
lim q~jq~, = lim P1(y, (k, s_i))/ PJ' (y, (k, s_i)) = 0 
n-oo · n-oc 
Heuce. for large electorates. formula (3.10) for the pivot probability has the following 
approximation: 
ojk ( ) - """"' 1 ( 0 rA ) rv 1 ( 0 J ) 
i y, s - . ~ . PT qj + IJI - 1 = 2 q{J,k} + q{j,k} 
J,kEJ<; I\ 
Remark 45 :\ote tha t the requirement that voters adopt a Bayesian equilibrium 
means that voters vote strategically in multi-candidate elections, Thus, a voter may 
rank u(y1, T) > u(y1• T), and yet (even if the realization of the payoff disturbances is 
zero) vote for their second ranked alternative l over their first ranked alternative j if 
the pivot probability for the first ranked alternative is sufficiently low in relation to 
that for the second ranked alternativf' so that we have O(l; y. S11 , T,)- O(j; y, S11 , T,) > 
0. 
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3.4 Candidate Equilibrium 
This sect ion examines the incentives of candidates competing for \"Otes 111 a world 
populated b~· voters who play quanta! response equilibrium strategies. \\·e establish 
that for a large enough electorate, N, a ll candidates adopting the socia l optimum 
constitutes a global equilibrium. In the case of two candid ates, the globa l equilibrium 
is unique. Our results hold regardless of the how the m easure p changes as the 
size of t he electorate increases. as long as the admissibility condit ion is met. ).lore 
specifically. recall that adm issibility required that the ry,1 are i.i.d. \Yith full support. 
\\"e also assume that the distribution of t he 17i1 is independent of the size n of X . 
For a fixed electorate, N . and measure p on T = fl iEN T" lrt s be any s trategy 
profile fo r the voters·' such that for any candidate positions, y E Y , s(y. T) is a quanta! 
respouse equilibrium for the voters, as described iu t he previous section. \\"e use t he 
notation 
i j(y) = i j(y , s(y, ·)) = E1 [i j(y, s(y, t); t )] (3.28) 
to represent the expected \·ote for the candidates j, assumi ng that the \'Oters follow 
the st rategy s in response. Then, 
' j (y) 
1 
- E 1 [l{i EN: s,(y. t;) = .i} l] n 
1 
-Er[E 77 [I{i EN : s;(y,Ti,TJi) =j}l]] n 




\\"e assume that candidates seek to maximize the m argin of expected victory. So 
lhr payoff of candidate j E /\. at t he profile (y . s) is given by: 
fj(y) = fj(y. s) = i j(y)- max i /(y). 
LEN - {J} 
(3.30) 
4 To be technically correct , since we a re considering Jl.: and p to be variables, we should subscript. 
voter a nd candidate strategies on these \·ariables. To simplify notation. we leave off these parameters. 
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L<'t 
:r; = arg I~l( L Er, [u (:r. T,)] 
tEN 
(3.31) 
denote the expected social optimum. vVe assume for each N and p t hat such a point 
exists and is unique. 
Theorem 46 Let 11 be uniformly bounded. There exists an integer n* such that for 
any set of voters N with \N\ = n > n * , and any admissible p on T = [I,EN T, 
y* = (x;, ... , x;) constitutes a global equilibrium under the margin of e.rpected victory: 
for any j E K and y1 E X , f ;(y) = f ;(y1 ,y:_ j)::; f ;(y*), with the weak inequality 
becommg strict whenever y1 f. .T*. 
Proof: For any set of voters .V , aml admissible p, let y = (Yj· y:_1) , where Yi = x; 
for a lll f. j and y1 f. :r; . We first show that for large enough n, I j(y) = Vi(y1 , y:_1 ) ::; 
I j(y*). 
For = E 3tK. write Q(z) = G1 (z). \Yhere G1 is as defined in Equation 3.18. Given 
an individual i E N , and using equations ( 3.9) and (3.12), the probability of a vote 
for candidate j is given by 
s,(y. T,)(j) = Pr [ 11)-ax [U(l: y. s , ti)- [ j(j; y, s, t,)] :S o] 
IEho - {J} 
[ 
7/ik - 1/i j ::; ..6-~(y, s). [u(y1 , Ti) - u(:r;, Ti)] fork E l\ - {j} ] Pr 
and 7]to - 1J,j ::; ..6-i(y, s) · [u(y1 , Ti)- u(:r:;, T,)] 
Q(~,(y, s) · [u(y1 , Ti)- u(x;. Ti)]) (3.32) 
where ..6-i(y. s) = (~}(y , s), . .. , ..6-~(.z;. s)) . ~~(y . s) = 2o~.J(y, s) + L a,ej,t of1(y, s), for 
alll E K- {j} , and ~;(y, s) = L a#J o:a(y. s). 
Using Equation 3.29 we can express the ,·ote for candidate j as 




Thl"n , from Equation 3.32, wP havl" that 
1 j(y) = ~ LET, [Q(6,(y, s) · [u(y1 , Tt)- u (.T~ , Tt)])] 
tEN 
\Yi thou t loss of generality, we can assume utility functions are normalized \\"i th 
u(x*, T;) = 0 for all i E N and Ti E T. Write ui = u(Yj· T;) E JR. and .6.; = 6; (y . s ). 
Then. the a bove can be written as: 
\ j(y) = ~ L ET, [Q(~;(y, s) · u(y1 , Ti))] =~LET, [Q(6(ui)] 
tEN tEA. 
(3.3.J) 
Using parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 43, normalize the 6 i by 6 1 in the following 
manner. ForiE N, let 
and 
It is easily shown that ~i > 0 for all i E lV and j E K. so that Xi is well defined . 
Then. applying Taylor's theorem, we can write 
1 
1 j(y)- \ j(y*) = - L {ET, [Q (D ·A_, · ui)] - ET, [c.? (0)]} 
n iE/\. 
~L ET, [(D · \ t · u,fQ' (0) + ~(6t · 11,)TQ" (z,(y)) (6t · 11,)] 
tEN 
(3.35) 
where ::"'(y) = o.O + (1 - n)(O . . .. , u;. 0, ... , 0) for some 0: E (0, 1) for each i E N, 
and 0 deBotes a k dimeusioual vector of zeros. 
:\ow. by Proposition .J3, it follows that for any c: > 0. we can find a value n* such 
1 
tlJAt max D < r, m<Lx,EN[max[(x,- 1)]] < (1- r), and max,EN[max[(~,]] < r for all 
11 > n*. Using these facts and continuing the derivation of 1 j(y)- 1 j(y*), 
1j(y)- i j(y*) = ~L Er, [Q'(O)D·\;·u,+~(~,·u;fQ"(::,(y))(~; · u,)] 
tEN 




1 L Er, [~;" · Q" (z,(y)) · ~i · u;] 
n iEN 
(3.36) 
\Yhere Q'(O) is a k dimensional vector consisting of the gradient of Q eYaluated at 0, 
Q"(O) is a k x k symmetric matrix of second partial derivatives of Q evaluated at 0. 
Q* is the smallest clement of Q' ( 0). Q** is defined as 
Q** = sup [Q"(z)], 
zERk 
and 1 represents a k dimensional vector of ones. 
\ \'p now want to show that there exists n* such that. for all N with 11 > n*, the 
right-hand side of Equation 3.36 becomes less than zero for all y i= x* E .\. For a 
giYen y i= x*, 
k 1,;2 
-;;-( 1 - E)EQ* L Er, [u;] + 
2
'TI E
2Q** L Er, [uf] 
tEN 1EN 
~: E2Q** L Er, [ un 
tEN 
- LtEN Er, [u;] 
LtEN Er, [u;] 
< 0 
< -~(1- E)EQ* L ET, [u;] 
n 1EN 
2(1 -E) Q* 
< Q**, 
The inequality in Equation 3.31 is satisfied for sufficient!~, small r > 0. Of course, 
this is for a given y i= x·. In order to satisfy Equation 3.37 for all y i= x*, we must 
take the supremum of the left-hand side over all y i= .T* . This supremum is defined 
to oe finite and denoted by !I I in Equation 3.1, resulting in the following requirement 
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for EqHA.tion 3.37 to hf' satisfiNI for all y :(= .r·: 
AI < 
2(1 -E) Q* 
kE Q**. (3 .37) 
As with Equation 3.31, for f sufficiently small, Equation 3.31 is satisfied . Thus. for 
any y1 E 1 ~, 1 j(y) = 1 j(y1 , y• 1 ) :::; 1 j(y*) with strict inequa lity whenever YJ :(= :r;. 
:\ext. we sho\Y that for some l :(= j. 1 i(yJ, y*_) 2:: 1 i(y•). \\"e picklE /\- {j} for 
which o11 (y, ~)is maximized. For z E ~1'·, write Q(z) = G1(z), where G, is as dcfwed 
in equation (3.18) . Then we have 
I 
U (0; y . s, r,)- U (l ; y, s, r,) :::; 0 , and I 
s;(y, r;)(l) Pr U(j; y, s . r,)- U (l; y, s , r,) :::; 0 , and 
maxkEK-{I ,J} [U(k: y, s, r,)- U(l; y, s, r,)] :::; 0, 
I 
T);o- TJil:::; ~~(y,s) · [u(x; ,r;) - u (ya,T;)],and I 
Pr T);3 - rJit :::; ~i(y, s) · [11(:r;, r,)- 11(y1, r,)], and 
TJik- TJit:::; maxkEI<- {I,j} (.6~(y. s) · [u (x~, r;)- v (yj,r;))] 
= Q(~.(y, s) · [·u(x;, Ti)- u(y1, Ti)]) 
where ~;(y . s) = (.6i(y, s), .... .6~(y, s)), with ~~(y, s) = Lr.r# t b~a(y, s), .6{(y, s) = 
2bi1 (y, s) + La#J,t bf0 (y, s), and ~~(y . s) = bfl(y. s)- o7j(y, s) for all kEf{- {l ,j}. 
Csing equation (3.29) wf' can express the vote for candidate I as 
(3.38) 
As above, we can assume utility functions are normalized with u(x*, r,) = 0 for all 
i E N and T, E T. As before, write 11, = u(y1 , r,), and .6, = .6.,(y, s). Then. thf' ahov<" 
can be written as: 
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:\otP that thP aboVf' takes Pxactly t lw samf' form as equation (3.3-l) abow. \Yith th<> 
exception of the negative sign. Consequently, an analogous argument to that in (3.36) 
establishes that we can find large enough n so that 1/(y) - 1 /(y*) is positive. Thus, for 
any Y1 E 1j. 1/(y) = 11(YrY:) 2: \ [(y•) with strict inequality whenever y1 :/= 1";. \\"e 
have shown that \ j(y1 , y:.1 ) :::; \ i(y*) ami \ l(y1 , .1/ 1 ) 2: \ i(y*). So C.J(y1 . y* 1 ) :::; (~ ( y*). 
So y• is a global equilibrium for the objective function (". I 
For the case of two candidates, the above theorem can be strengthened: 
Coro llary 4 7 If k = 2. then the equilibrium found in Theorem 4 6 is unique. 
Pmof: Suppose there is another equilibrium, y. Then for at least one candidate j, 
y1 f. x*. Assume v\'.L.O.G. that j = 2. By Theorem 46. f] (y1 , Y2) 2: f1 (x*. Y2) > 0. 
HPnce. f2(YI· Y2) < 0. But this can not be an equilibrium for candidate 2, since 
f2(YI, .T*) 2: 0 > f2(Yt· Y2)· This yields a contradiction. Hence the equilibrium is 
umque. I 
\'ote that in the equilibrium defined by Theorem 46, that y; = Yi = x; for all 
j.l E 1\. Hence, we have u(y;, Ti) = u(yi, T,) for all j.l E ]{. Thus, the level of 
abstention in equilibrium is determined by \ 0(y*. s) =~LiEN Er, [si(y* , T,)(O)]. But 
s,(y*, T,)(O) Pr [ ~~( [C(l; y*. s, t,)- C'(O; y*, s, ti) + TJil- 1Jio] :::; 0] 
= Pr h')f [~ 81"(y, s) [u(yi, r,) - u(y:, r,)] + ~'' - 7J.o] $ 0] 
Pr [TJio 2: max [TJiL]] . 
IE /\ 
For example, if c, = 0 for all i E N. then under the assumptions we have made, all of 
the TJil for 1 E K 0 <He i. i . d. Hence the above evaluates to /\~ 1 . It follows that 
So that in a t\\·o candidate election. one would obtain equilibrium turnout of about 
8-1 
t\m thirds of rhe Plecrorare. Of course. the (tbovf' C(tlcul<ltion \YOu]d h<' \'NY sensiriv<' 
to the assumed distribution of costs of voting. 
Thus. asymptotically we find that the social optimum is a global equilibrium so 
long as preferences are uniformly bounded. 
3.5 Conclusions 
We have provided a general framework for probabilistic spatial voting models in large 
electorates. In particular, we have extended equilibrium results of Coughlin. Ledyard, 
and ot!Jcr researchers to spaces of arbitrary fi.uite dimensionality aud electious with 
both abstention and arbitrary numbers of candidates. In addition, our model allows 
for strategic behavior by the voters. 
As an aside, our model is agnostic as to t he cause of probabilistic choice. The 
probabilistic choice in a QRE model can be assumed to arise either as the result of 
rational beha,·ior under payoff disturbances (as we have modeled it here), or as the 
result of bouudedly rational behavior. A key point to uote iu interpreting our results is 
that, with respect to the distributions of the alternative-specific payoff disturbance, we 
have assumed only that these distribntions possess fnll support and are independently 
and identically distributed. while allovving for the a bstention-specific shock to possess 
a nonidentical, independent distribution. In particular, we do not require that these 
payoff shocks be in any sense large. Thus, our results demonstrate the existence of 
an asymptotic equilibrium at the social welfare optimum in a relatively large class of 
probabilistic voting models. 
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Chapte r 4 Variational R esponse Equilibrium 
4 .1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses a Bayesian framework for games \\·ith incornplcl(' iufonuatiou 
and possibly continuous action spaces. In particular, we define a framework in which 
Pach player's true payoff functions ar<> nnohservecl hy eithN the mocleler or thf' othc>r 
players. Each player"s payoff function is assumed to be continuous \Yi th respect to 
the action space and is the sum of two terms: an observable component and an 
unobserved component, both of which are assumed to be continuous with respect to 
the action space. 
For any game of complete information. r 0 . with continuous payoff functions. we 
define a class of incomplete information games which possess the payoffs of [ 0 as the 
observable component of players' payoffs. v\"e restrict the incomplete information to 
be with respect to continuous variations of these payoffs. 
Using this class of extensions of f 0 , we define the set of (possibly mixed) strategy 
profiles which are rationalizable as Bayesian :"Jash equilibria of such an incomplete 
information extension of r o, r. \\"e term any element of this set a variational response 
equilibrium of r 0. 
Our frame\vork is similar to the work of sen•ral other scholars. l\ Iost recently, 
our work is closely related to the notion of quanta! response equilibrium (QRE), first 
defined by :VIcKelvey and Palfrey for both extensive-form (1998) and normal-form 
games (1995) with finite action spaces. A similar notion of equilibrium is due to 
Cheu, Friedman, and Thisse (1997), t hough their notiou of bouudedly rational Nash 
equilibrium is narrower in scope than the QRE. 
Earlier work on issues closely related to those examined here includes the work 
of Harsauyi (1961-68). (1973) on perturbed games and the work of Aumann. et al. 
(1983) on purification of mixed strategies. The work of l\Iilgrom and Weber (1985) 
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is a senJinal rontrihntion to the understanding of Bayesian rquilihria in ganws of 
incomplete information. :\Iilgrom and \\.eber define a distributional strategy as a 
measure over the Cartesian product of a player's action and type spaces. Our Theorem 
58 rests upon their equilibrium existence result (Theorem 1 in :\Iilgrom and \Ycbcr 
( 1985)). Similarly. the logic behind our Theorem 59 closely resembles i\lilgrom and 
\Yebcr·s existencr result as well. 
This framework has many similaritiPs to that Pxamin<'d in i\filgrom and \YPiwr 
( 1985) . On the technical side, the conditions of our Theorem 58 satisfies their As-
sumptions Ill (Equicontinuous payoffs) and Il2 (Absolutely Continuous Information). 
Substantively. however. our framework differs in its motivation. :\Iilgrom and 'v\'eber 
established existence results for a very general class of games of incomplete informa-
tion. Our moti"ation is to proYide a particular foundation for the study of games in 
which payoff perturbations arc continuous with respect to the players' actions spaces. 
Thus. while we do prO\·ide a result (Theorem 59) using assumptions whose relation-
ship to :\Iilgrom and \Yeber's Rl and R2 is not clear,1 the point of this chapter is 
essentially to direct attention at a specific application of their results. 
This chapter provides a Bayesian frame,,·ork for understanding behavior in strate-
gic situations within a framework of unobserved payoff disturbances. In many cases, 
t hcorists assume that agents possess continuous payoff functions. This framework 
does not depart from this assumption. Our generalization of the perturbed games 
literature is to allow for utilit~· perturbations which are correlated across possibly a 
continu urn of pure actions. \ Ye allow this both for mathematical generality as well 
as possibly increased empirical realism. In addition, we can allow for correlation be-
tween the utility perturbations recei,·ed by different players (Theorem 59). Our main 
result (Theorems 58). howeYer. assumes that each player's shock is independent of 
her opponents' perturbations. 
\Ye first define the notion of variational response equilibr·ium (\.RE). :\!ext we 
prO\·e existence of variational response equilibria as well as the existence of equilib-
1 That is. the conditions under which Theorem 59 holds are not nested with Milgrom and Weber's 
Assumptions Ill a nd H.2. 
87 
rllllll Jll a class of gamPs of incomplPtf' information ,,·hich satisfy a wf'akPr informa-
tional requirement. In addition, we provide some discussion of the similarities and 
differences between QRE in finite games and VRE in finitf' and continuous games. 
Cnfortunately, our definition does not appear to yield itself 0asily to empirical 
applicatiou, as our type space is the space of coutinuou::; functions ou a rHelrizable 
action space. A different tact one coultl take in attempting to extend th0 definition 
would b0 to t)f'gi n with the desired characteristics of individual hehavior, such as t ha r 
more costly mistakes are no more likely to be made than less costly ones. for example. 
and then examine the properties of fixed points of quanta! response correspond0nces 
satisfying these characteristics. 
\Ve define our primiti,·es in Section 4.2. Our existence results are found in Section 
-1.3. Conclusions are offered in Section 4..!. 
4.2 The Model 
In this section we describe the basic assumptions of our model. \ \ "e cousider uormal-
form games. Let IV denote the set of players, with INI = n < oo. 
4.2.1 Action Spaces 
Let A; denote the action space of pla.yer i. For all i E N, w0 assume that A, is a 
compact subset of a complete and separable metric space, and write A = n iEN A,. 
Assumption 48 For all i E N, A, is a compact subset of a complete and separable 
metric space. 
4.2.2 Preferences and Types 
Each player i E S is endO\wd with a payoff function ui A ~ R. \V0 assume that 
u, E C(A: !R). 
Assumption 49 For all i E 1\' . u, E C(A; IR). 
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Earh pl<tyPr i E N possesses <t type, 7], E T, = C(A,: IR) . \\'hirh represents rtn 
additive payoff perturbation. The player receives the payoff perturbation associated 
with the action she chooses, regardless of the other players' actions. \\'e \Hite T = 
f1~1 T, for the space of all possible type profiles. 
Formally, let B(X) denote Lhe Borel a-algebra Oil C(X: .IR), where X dellotcs ally 
compact subset of a complete and separable metric space. For each i E 1Y. let p, be 
an aromless probability mr::~smr drfinecl on B (A,). 2 As we state formally helmY. we 
will denote the resulting product measure on rriE.IV B ( . .{,) by p, the joint distribution 
of types. which is represented by an atomless measure since each Pi is assumed to be 
atomless. 
Assumption 50 The distTibutwn of 1) is TepTesented by a pmbability measuTe. 
WheTe each Pi is atomless. Such a pmbability measuTe p is TefeTTed to as admissible. 
Assumption 50 is equivalent to assuming that players' types, or utility pertur-
bations. are independently distributed. As alluded to above, it is possible to prove 
cxistrnrr of ::\ash cquili bria in distri bu tiona! strategies by assuming only that the 
joint distribution of types is atomless on T, which we show formally in Theorem 59. 
In our framev,:ork, the payoff functions are assumed to be continuous with respect 
to the action space and the types enter in a simple and very particular fashion. As 
discussed above, and now defined formally, we assume that the privately observed 
types affect payoffs in an addit ively separable fashion. 
Assumption 51 Given an actwn pTofile a E A. and type 17t E Cb(A.,), playeT i 
Trrr.ives a payoff of 
(.J. l ) 
2Such a measure exists siuce A is cou1pact aud heuce C(A; JW.) is Polish (Alipraut is aud Border 
(199-1). Theorem 11.58, p.407). 
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LPt u = {u l ···· ,nn } ;mclv = {vt .· · · ,vn}· Any gamP r = (LI.N.A..v,(l) saJ-
isfying Assumptions 49-51 is termed admissible. For clarity, we denote the game of 
complete information corresponding to r by f 0 = (U, N, A ), and will often write 
r = (fo , v, p) when the context is clear. 
4.2.3 Distributional Strategies 
Distri bu tiona! strategies are a means of describing mixt urcs over possibly uncountably 
infinite action and type spaces. 
Definition 52 A distributional strategy for player i is a probability measure f-Li 
A , x T, --7 [0. 1] where the marginal of f-L, on Ti is equal to Pi. 
The notion of a distributional strategy is meant to represent a possibly mixed 
strategy while avoiding measurability problems with continuous action and/or type 
spaces. The requirement that the ma rginal distribution of a players ' distributional 
strategy with respect to her type equals the true distribution of her type represents 
the fact that a player can not change her type distribution. 
4.2.4 Expected Payoffs 
The expected payoff for player i of action ai E A.i, given type TJi and opponents' 
strategies /-L-i, is giYen by 
V;(ai; 'TJi, 1-L - i) 
We denote the set of all distributional strategies for player i by Ah and write 
M = f1:'=1 M i for the set of all possible vectors of distributional strategies. For 
anv player i E N, we write f-L- i = {f-L1, ... , /-Li- t , f-Li+l• ... , f-in} for the profile of i's 
opponents' distributional strategies. The space of a ll such vectors for a given player 
i is denoted by i\1 -i. 
\Ve will denote the expected payoff of player i, given distributional strategy profile 
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1'· /)\· ff ~(/' ). Formally. 
n·, = EIL[u,(a) + ry, (a,]. (-1.2) 
The next result notes that 11', is linear in J-L,. 
Le mma 53 Fori E .\' , any a. E [0. 1], any {3 E IR, and any 1'-i E .~L,. and any pai1' 
of dtstributional strategzes p 1 , 11~ E j\/,. 
and 
Proof: The result follows from t he fact that integration is a linear functional. I 
4.2.5 Equilibrium in Distributional Strategies 
D efinition 54 A Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies is an !\'-tuple. J-L* 
( 11~, ... , fL~) for which, for all i E .V and all {1 ; E ,\!21 
In \\'Ords, a !\ash equilibrium is a vector of distributional strategies at which no player 
has an alternative distributional strategy that \Yould result in a strictly higher payoff. 
\\'e now define a p-\ 'ariational Response Equilibrium of a game of complete in-
formation , r 0 . as any :\ash equilibrium in distributional strategies of the game of 
incomplete information given by (f 0 , T. p), where pis admissible. and T = C(.-1 : IR), 
endowed \Yith its Borel 0'-algebra. 
D efinition 55 For an admissible game f = (f0 , T , p), let ,,. be a Nash equilibriv.m in 
distributional strategies. Then the marginal distribution of IL* with r·espect to the ac-
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tion spar:e A, denoted by a~· : B(A) --7 [0, 1] is a p-Variational Response Eq11ilibrium 
of fo . 
D efinition 56 Let r 0 be a game of complete information and ( O"t .... , O" N) br a vec-
tor of probability measures, with O"; : B(A,) --7 [0, 1]. Then the product measure 
O" = n;:1 O"; is a Variational Response Equilibrium of r 0 if there exists an admissible 
probability measure p, defined on B(C(A; JR)), and a p- Variational Response Equilib-
ri'U1n ~L· satisfying 
for all a EA. 
O"(a) = r J.L*(a. t)dt 
.lr 
Thus, one can view the set of variational response equilibria for a game of complete 
information r as being parameterized by p, since the nature of v, i.e., t hat the payoff 
shocks are additive with respect to p ure actious, is specified by the definition of 
admissibility. 
4.3 Existence 
In this section we prove existence of variational response equilibria for all games 
possessing continuous payoff functions. The next lemma states that, for a given p, 
the set of d istributional strategy profiles is closed in the weak* topology. This result 
is referred to by :\ lilgrom and Weber (1985) in the proof of their Theorem 1, but not 
shown. In addition, Mas-Colell (198-1) implicitly refers to this result in t he proof of 
his Theorem 1. Being unable to find a formal proof of this fact, it is included here. 
Lemma 57 Given a type distribution p, the set of distributional strategy profiles, 
,U(.-1 x T: p), is a closed subset of P(A x T) when endowed with the weak* topology. 
Proof : v.·hen endowed with t he relative weak* topology induced by the weak* topol-
ogy on P (A x T), .1\I(A x T: p) is a metric spare. Th11s. onf' can verify its dosm e by 
checking sequences. In addition. the separability and completeness of A and T ensure 
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th;u P (.·l x T) is romplrt<' and srpamhlr (i.r .. Polish ) \Yhrn 0ndomxl \Yith tlw w<'nk* 
topology (Aliprantis and Border (199-!), Theorem 14.15). 
We knO\Y that .AJ(.4 x T ; p) is a t ight set of probability measures3 beca use A x T 
is Polish. and every finite Borel meas ure on a Polish space is regular (Aliprantis and 
Border, (1994), Theorem 10.7). 
By ProhorO\·'s theorem (Billingsley (1968). p. 2-!0), .\I is a relatively compact 
suhsPt of P (.4 x T) whf'n l'ndowf'd with thf' wPak* topolog~-.~ Thus, let {!'a} lw a 
sequence in l lfp(A x T ). The relative compactness of M ensures that {11 0 } contains a 
weak* convergent subsequence, so we assume without loss of generality that {Jln} is 
itself a weak* convergent sequence. with limit f.L necessarily in if, the closure of 11!. 
\\'e now sho\v that the limit, f.L, is itself a distributional strategy profile in M (A x 
T; p). To sho\v this, we must sho"· three things: (1) J.L(A x T) = 1. (2) 11 is nonnegativE' 
for all Borel subsets of A x T. and (3) the marginal of J1 with respect to T equals p. 
\ \"e now proceed to shO\v these in order. 
(1) From Theorem H.3 in Aliprantis and Border (199-!). weak* convergence of f.Ln 
to J1 is equivalent to 
lim sup f.Lu(F) ~ f.L(F) ( 4.3) 
Q 
for each closed set F E A x T, and 
lim inf f.La (G) 2 fl,( G) 
{) 
( 4.4) 
for each open set G E A x T. 
Letting F =Ax T (which is a closed set since the empty set is open), it is trivial 
to see that lim supn ILa(A x T) = lim sup{ l. 1, ... , } = 1. Then, if fLo ::::} f.L, it must 
be the case that f.L(A x T ) 2 1. 
3 A st>t :F of probability measures on a s pace X is tight if, for each E. > 0 there exists a compact 
set I\ satisfying JL (I\ ) > 1 - E for each fl. E F. 
4 A su bset 1' of a topological space.\ is re/atJVcly compact if its closure is compact. 
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SirJJiJarJy, note that F is also an open Borel subs<'t of A xT. anrllim in£0 {1. 1. .... } = 
1. so that f.Lo ==? fL. implies J.L (A x T ) :::; 1. Therefore, f.Ln ==? fJ implies that fL (.-l. x T ) ~ 1 
and ft ( A x T ) :::; 1, meaning that J.L ( .-1 x T ) = l. 
(2) Since fLoE 111(.-l. xT;p) for all a, any closed set B C .-l. xT, limsup0 J-Lo (B ) ~ 0. 
By Equation -1.3 , 
fL(B ) > lim supJ.Lo(B) 
0 
> 0, 
implying that f1 is nonn<'gativ<' for all dosed subsC'ts of A x T. 
(3) For all a, 
r dfLo (a, TJ ) = p. 
}A 
Since integration is a linear functional, for any sequence f.Lo it must be the case that 
implying that 
.I dJL(a, 17) = p. 
Thus. the marginal of fJ with respect to T is equal top. Therefore, lilllo-oo f.Lo E 
.\1( .-1 x T: p) for all convergent sequences {J.L0 }. so that 1\I is closed, completing the 
proof. I 
Let ¢, : .\L, -+-+ llli denote the best response correspondence for pla.ver i and 
Theorem 58 L et r be adrmssible. and u, E C (A; JH:) for all i E N. Th en r 0 possesses 
a Va1·iatiunal R esponse E(ruil'ib·rimn. 
Pmof: \\'p show that conditions R1 and R2 for ThPon·m 1 in ~lilgrom and \YPlH'r 
( 1985) arc satisfied. Endowing T with the topology of uniform convergence, r, : 
T x A --7 IR is a uniformly continuous function. Hence. by Proposition 1 in ~Iilgrom 
and Weber ( 1985), Condition Rl is satisfied. The random variables { Tt . .... T,,.} 
arc mutually indepeudeut so that. by Proposition 3 iu :\1ilgroru aud \\'cber (1985). 
Assumption R2 is satisfied. Therefore. by Theorem 1 in ~Iilgrom and \Yeber (1985). 
rlwrC' Pxists an PCjnilihrinm in distribntiorral stratPgiC's. Tlw projC'ction of Sl!C'h an 
equilibrium onto A is a variational response equilibrium of f 0 . I 
\Ve now digress for a moment to prove an existence result under the assumption 
that the joint distribution of types, p. possesses full support and is atomless. Only the 
latter of t hese conditions is implied by our earlier assumptions. Oue irnplicatiou of our 
requirement is that the players can assign no profile of the other players· types zero 
probability conditionaJ upon their own type. Nen•rtlwless, their mnditional beliefs 
about the other players' types may differ according to the realization of their own 
type, of course. 
Theorem 59 Let p be an atomless distribution on T = fE=r C(Ai) and ui : A --7 1R 
be continuous for each i E .Y. Then r 0 possesses a Variational Response Equilibrium. 
Proof: For all i E N, H', is an integral of the sum of continuous functions, 
Endowing ,1/ with the product \\'Pak* topology, n·, is continuous on M. Since T 
is a complete and separable metric space, p is a tight probability measure. 
Since pis tight. it follows from Prohorov's Theorem that ,U is a relatively compact 
set for each i E .Y (see Billingsley (1968), p. 2<10). By Lemma 57. M is closed. The 
closure of a relatively compact set is compact. so ,H is compact. 
By the continuity of H'; and Berge's Theorem of the :\Iaximum (Aliprantis and 
Bordrr (1994), Throrcm 14.30), th<' graph of¢, is clos<'d for <'ach i E N. Every clos<'d 
subset of a compact topological space is compact. so that the graph of d;, is compact. 
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Tn arlrlition. thP graph of c/J, is conwx hy tlw linearity of H', for all i E .\' (LPmma 03). 
In addition. having closed graph implies that c/Ji is upper hemicontinuous since .\I, 
is a compact space. The product of upper hemicontinuous correspondences is upper 
hemicontinuous (see Border, (1985), Proposition 11.25). This implies that 0 is an 
upper hemicontinuous correspoudeuce. 
Thus. by Fan's fixed point theorem (1952). there exists J..L EM such that J..L E 0(11 ). 
Such a fixNl point is a 1\ash PCJllilihrium in distrihutional stratPgiPs, completing th<' 
proof I 
4.4 Comparisons, Extensions, and Conclusions 
In this chapter we have drfined and explored the notion of variational response equi-
librium. The notion of VRE is in some senses a generalization of the notion of quanta! 
response equilibrium in finite games. It is also related to the more general literature 
on games with perturbed payoffs. Primarily. our definition of VRE allows for correla-
tion of payoff perturbations across actions. Indeed , correlation of payoff disturbances 
across actions is required within our frame\vork (except as a limiting case) \vhenever 
the action space is continuous. In addition. we have shown that certain types of 
correlation can be ai!O\ved between the realizations of players' types (Theorem 59). 
Several questions follO\v from our definition. For example, are any probability 
measures on A not variational response equilibria of r 0 ? That is, do there exist 
mixed strategy profiles that can not be rationalized according to an admissible game of 
iucomplete iufonnatiou? One conjecture along this dimension is that any measure, a : 
B(.-l. ) ----* [0, 1] induced by a YRE must have full support on .4. This is a characteristic 
of quanta! response equilihria in finite games. as well as the notion of logit equilibrium 
used by Anderson. Goeree, and Holt. The validity of the conjecture is not known at 
this point. however. A related question is whether we can use this refinement to select 
certain equilibria of the complete information game, f 0 • 
9G 
4.4 .1 VRE and QRE in Finite Games 
The 11otiou of qua11tal respow;c equilibrium. as discussed earlier, has been dl'fin('d 
as a Bayes 1'\ash equilibrium in games with finite action spaces. Our definition of 
variational response equilibrium is also defined for such games. givf'n a metric on th<' 
action space, A. This section discusses the relationship between QRE and \ 'RE in 
finite normal form games. 
The idea underlying quanta! response equilibrium is that players are unable to 
commit to playing any action \Yith zero probability. This lack of commitment ability 
ma~· be due to any of several factors, including imperfect implementation of a pure 
strategy (e.g., trembles). incorrect lwliPfs, or idiosyncratic shocks to each player's 
preferences. Thus, the notion of QRE is both a theoretical" and an empirical tool. 
Theoretically, the QRE framework provides an environment in which to examine the 
properties of games in which there is always a positive probability that each action 
profile will be observ(-'d. On the other hand. the QRE has already been fruitfully 
applied in attempts to explain actual behavior in the laboratory (see :\IcKelvey and 
Palfrf'y (1995), (1998)). 
1\lcKelvey and Palfrey define the QRE as a Bayesian equilibrium of a game in 
which each player observes independently and identically distributed shocks to th<' 
expected payoff for each action available to her. Thus. the set of quanta! response 
equilibria is parameterized by the distribution from which these payoff perturbations 
are drawn. This formulation implies that payers me more likely to choose actions 
,,.it h higher expected payoff, ceteris pari bus. 
The empirical motivations behind \ 'RE are similar in spirit to those behind QRE. 
Both equilibrium concepts are moti,·ated by a desire to provide stochastic explana-
tions for de,·iations from l\ash equilibrium play. The substances of the two notions 
are not identical. however. In particular. even in finite games, the notion of varia-
tional response equilibrium is sensitive to the "distance'' between two actions. This 
is because, for any player in a finite game, the distance between actions dctermiues 
tlw correla t ions between that playN's action-specific utility perturbations. Tn a QRE, 
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P<lrh action ·s 11tility JH'rtnrhation is realized indepencl0nth·. regarcllc~ss of any m0tric 
structure which the action space may possess. 
For finite games in which some player has more than two pure actions. the type 
distributions which are admissible in our framework contain those distributions ,,·hich 
l\ lcl\:elvey and Palfrey (1995) classify as admissiule for quantal response equiliuria as 
a strict subset. In fact , we can provide the following nesting result. "·hich stat<'S 
that. for P\'ery finite norma] form game fo, if a• is a probability distribution On .-1 
which is induced by some quanta] response equilibrium \vith payoff perturbations 
distributed according to an admissible probability measure F , then there exists an 
admissible type distribution p and type space T \vhich generate a variational response 
eq uili uri um which induces a on ...1 as well. 
Let ...1 , be finite for every player i, with jA;j =a:;. and let f 0 = (.Y, A. U). For each 
i E N, relabelling A;. define A.; = { 1, ... , oi}. !\ow define T; to be set of piecewise 
continuous functions from [1, o,] defirwd as 
T, = {g E C([O,o;]:IR): 't:h· rf: .-i,g(T) = (g(lTJ) - g(fTl))(T -lTJ)}, 
and 
a, 
p, =II PL 
J""l 
with 
pf(T) = Pr[g(j)::; Tj = F,(r), 
for nl l j E .4;, whc>n:• F; is the> cum1!lat ivP ciensity function of the pnyoff pc>rtmhntions 
\Yhich generates (J as a quantal responsp equilibrium of ro (see l\IcKelvey and Pal-
frey (1995)). Thus. by enriching the type space and choosing the type distribution 
judiciously, any QRE of a finite normal form game can be justified as a variational 
response equilibrium. The converse is easily seen to ue false. 
There are other important differences aside from the fact that every QRE is also 
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n \·nE in finite games. In particulnr, if th0 game bring pla.yrd is a multistag<' gamP.. 
even in normal form, the choice of metric over the space of all pure actions for any 
given player may have an enormous impact on the set of ,·ariational response equilibria 
of such a game, due to the presence of correlation in the unobserved payoff shocks. 
\\'c feel that the notion of QRE in fi.nite gauH'S . as defined by :\lch:ch·ey am! 
Palfr<'y. is best thought of as either representing the unobservable' characteristics 
of playNs in a ganw or as a statistical model of bounded rationality. Tlw latt<'r 
interpretation is qualified by the restriction that players are less likely to make a 
mistakr the more costly that mistake is in expectation. \ Ye have presented a notion, 
that of variational response equilibrium, which is similar in spirit and "·hich we feel 
can be motivated in the same fashion. 
One technical difference between thr notions is that the \'RE is defined for games 
with possibly continuous action spaces. But two key clements of our framework, re-
gardless of the action space, are that ,·ariational response equilibrium requires that 
the action space be endowed with a metric. and that the pa_voff shocks obsen·ed by 
anv given player are correlated ,,·ith respect to this metric. Indeed , for the case of 
continuous action spaces. we suspect that this correlation is necessary for payoff max-
imization to make anv sense. Regardless this metric is an exorrenous (and seeminrrl\· ... , 0 0 ... 
unobservable) parameter of the frame\YOrk. 
4 .4.2 VRE: A Continuous Version of QRE? 
One might ask whether variational response equilibrium is the natural extension of 
quanta! response equilibrium to games with continuous action space's. \\·e argue that 
it is not, for the following reasons. First. the comparative statics of the QRE in finite 
games are similar to many models of probabilistic choice, such as the Luce model 
(19:J9) and the random payoff maximization framework of :\IcFadden (1981). among 
others. \ Ye discuss belO\Y \Yhy such comparative statics, such as the fact that t he 
probability of a player choosing some strategy T is weakly increasing in the expected 
payoff offerrd hy .r, may not hold for \.RE. 
Second. at least one of the paramcterizations of the QRE, the logit QRE, has an 
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r1 ppl'aling f11nctiona l analogu<' in t h<' continuous casE>. t<'rm('(] h\· :\ ncl<'rson. Gof'r<'<'. 
and Holt (1998) the "logit equilibrium." 
Let r be an n player game. In a logit equilibrium, for each player i E .Y. the 
probability that an action 1· with corresponding expected payoff C;(x) is chosen by 
player i is given by 
eU,(:r) 
J;(1·) = j' eU,(x). 
A, 
(4.5) 
This functional form has been used both theoretically and empirically by sewral 
researchers. including Anderson. Go0ree. and Holt (1997). (1998). and Capra. Goeree. 
Gomez, and Holt (1997). \Ye discuss below the potential problems \\·ith rationalizing 
the logit equilibrium as a variational response equilibrium. 
Finally, a central assumption of \'RE is that there is an ordering of each player's 
act ion space. In particular , each player's action spacE> is endowed with a metric. The 
perturbation associated with an action is more highly correlated with the perturba-
tions of nearby actions than \Yith those of actions further away. In a quanta! response 
equilibrium. each player's choice probabilities are invariant to a "shuffling'· of t he 
~trategies - the ordering of the strategies is irrelevant. \\'e show l>elow that this is not 
the case in general for variational response equilibria. 
Comparative Statics 
A kc\· qualitati\·e element of Quanta! Response Equilibria in finite games is that ac-
tions \Yith higher expected payoff (gi\·en a distributional strategy profile for player i's 
opponents) are played \Yith higher probability and choice probabilities are continuous 
fuuctions of the expected payoffs of the strategies. \·aria.t ioual response equilibria 
may not ha\·e the continuity propert~·. and very likely do not possess the monotonic-
iry property in general. as two actions may yield thC' same f'XJWCt<'cl payoff hut h<Wf' 
wry different expected payoffs due to the expected payoffs of other actions which are 
'·close'' to either of them. 
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Functional Forms 
The fact that comparatiw statics are difficult to provide for general \·ariatioual re-
sponse equilibria highlights a more fundamental problem: \Yhat do ,·ariational re-
sponse equilibria look like? That is, one \vould like to be able. ewn if only for 
a restricted class of type distributions, to write down a function of the obsen·able 
payoffs ,,·hich generates a set of variational response equilibria to a giYen game of 
complete information, r 0:5 
It seems that studying random payoff maximization m au environment with a 
possibly uncountable choice set is not only difficult, but that the links that exist 
between functional form models, such a.s that nsf'd by Anderson, Goerec, a.nd Holt 
(1997), (1998), and Capra. Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (1997). and models based in a 
Bayesian equilibrium setting, such as that defined here, are not at all clear. As an 
example, it is not known at this time whether or not there exists any admissible type 
distribution p for which the not.ion of logit equilibrium employed in Anderson. Goeree, 
and Holt (1998) is a p-variational response equilibrium. It seems that the answer 
to this question is no, since the logit equilibrium shares thr monotonicity proprrty 
possessed by the quanta! response equilibrium as discussed above. In particular, for 
any player i EN any two actions x andy in . .-l.i satisfying Ui(.r) = Ui(y), f(:c) = f(y), 
meaning that. conditional on choosing either x or y, each is equally likely to be chosen 
in a logit equilibrium. A more rigorous answer to this question is left as a topic for 
future research. 
The Action Space 
As stated earlier, the notion of variational response equilibrium imposes both a met-
ric on the action space as well as a framework of unobserved payoff shocks, while 
the notion of quantal response equilibrium only imposes a framework of unobserved 
payoff shocks. Each player's payoff shocks iu the ,·ariatioual respouse equilibriuw 
5 Indecd. as Tom Palfrey has pointed o ut. to me, the notion of quanta! response equilibrium began 
as a functional form; in particular. as the discrete version of the logit equilibrium discussed above. 
See :\Id\:!'lvey and Palfrey (1996). 
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arc> rorrPlatPrl with rPspPrt to thr mPtric imposPc! on hPr action spacr. This is vPry 
different from the assumption of independent payoff shocks which rationalize quanta! 
response equilibria from a Bayesian perspective. 
4.4.3 Extensions 
Possible extensions of this framework include allowing for the payoff perturbation to 
enter i11 ways other than as an additive shock. In addition. there are many alternative 
type spaces \Yhich could be exami11ed. We have explored the possibility of directly 
extending the definition employed by \IcKelvey and Palfrey (1995) by assuming that 
C'ach player is enc!owed with a continn urn of independently and identically distri bn trd 
random perturbations, one for each pure action. It turns out that the arg max of 
the resulting v; function is not even guaranteed to be Lebesgue measurable. This 
problem is related in an intimate fashion to the use of the Axiom of Choice which 
is required by the uncountable nature of the action space. Thus, such an extension 
does not seem to even make sense. much less be tractable. 
A more promising extension wonld bC' to tnke a. space of random walks ( \Yhich 
is. of course. a subset of the type space assumed here) generated by a particular 
random process. such as a normally distributed '·step" (i .e., Brownian motion). The 
potential value of such an approach largely consists of the ability to say more about 
the characteristics of behavior in such a framework. In addi tion, such a definition of 
the type space may be more appealing from a descriptive standpoint. 
In short. much remains to be developed in the theory of perturbed games. We 
argue that any complete theory must begin to place a structure on the game being 
played. By placing a structurf' we mean that the theory must account for explicitly 
behaYioral effects of the game's context, design, and representation. 
\\·e have attempted to start this endeavor by placing a metric on the action space, 
a technique \Yhich is a very preliminary attempt at capturing, for example, the sim-
ilarity of actions as perceived by the players. Other aspects of games which a more 
cornpiNP tlwory might t.akP into account inclnde the implications of different play-
ers' roles (e.g. , whether a player pPrceives some of his opponents as having more or 
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lf'ss of nn Arh·anrAgf'. \YhPtlwr a playf'r infPrs somNhing ahout oth<'r pla~·f'r~· fur11r<' 
behavior from his or her own perceptions, etc.), differences in mental rcprcscn tat ions 
of stochastic processcss. the effect of the order in ,,·hich decisions arc made in an 
exten~i vc-form game. and the representation of payoffs (e.g .. payoffs as losses wrsus 
gaius, payoffs expresst•d relat ive to otht•r players. elc.), among what is surely a large 
number of other possibilities. 
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